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Abstract: 
This dissertation examines the effects of competitive actions on strategic choice. Despite 
acknowledging that competitive behavior might be an important determinant of 
organizational strategy, researchers in strategic management have yet to explore how 
competitive actions that firms adopt to acquire competitive advantage can also encourage 
future strategic decisions. Competitive actions can be sources of strategic choice because 
they expose the firm to its competitive environment. This exposure to the competitive 
environment generates salient experience and knowledge that narrow managerial 
selection of strategic alternatives, therefore influencing strategic choice.  
 
This dissertation develops a conceptual framework that links competitive dynamics to 
strategic choice literature and provides an empirical model grounded on observable and 
quantitative variables. Specifically, it tests how characteristics of competitive actions 
such as scope, and the use of action repertoires can directly influence strategic choices 
such as the adoption of diversification strategies, the divestment of assets, and the 
implementation of corporate social responsibility policies.  
 
Results confirm the theoretical prediction that competitive actions are drivers of strategic 
choice. I found support that characteristics of actions like breadth and the diversity of 
repertoires that firms adopt to compete are motivators of strategic choice. Such findings 
indicate that previously neglected connections between competitive behavior and strategy 
are relevant and indicative that firms might access knowledge and experience previously 
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Firms compete through actions and those actions create knowledge and experience. 
Organizational theory and management literature examined how actions are firms’ responses to 
environmental factors (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Argyris and Schön, 1978; Chandler, 1962; 
Lawrence and Dyer, 1983) as they are means of adaptation, information, and coordination 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997). This scholarship determines that actions result from rules and 
routines (March, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1974), managerial intentions, competencies and 
decisions (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; March, 1981; Child, 1972, Thompson, 1967), conflict and 
negotiation among organizational actors (March, 1981, Dutton and Jackson, 1987); actions 
trigger organizational change (March 1981; Washington and Ventresca, 2004), and they enable 
organizational actors to build narratives to make sense of the environment (Weick, 1977, 1979; 
March, 1981). In strategic management, actions concretize managers’ strategic vision and are 
“the mechanisms that shape what a company really does” (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007: 420). 
Actions embody the firm’s strategy (Porter, 1985) because it is through actions that firms 
position themselves in the market to attain above average performance (Porter, 1996; Ghemawat 




Although it is accepted that actions are core elements of organizational life that affect functional 
aspects (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), the performance, and the survival of organizations (Argyris 
and Schön, 1978; Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Dyer, 1983; Dutton and Jackson, 1987), limited 
attention has so far been given to the idea that actions, in particular competitive actions, might 
define and determine the type of decisions and choices organizations make. Nevertheless, 
business narratives hint that actions may be important triggers of firms’ decisions and choices. 
For example, the Wrigley Company started as a soap and sundries concern but it was the fact that 
it offered complimentary gum sticks to its customers that prompted its entry in the confectionary 
business and led to its eventual dominance of this market (Wrigley Company website, n.d.). 
Amazon, the worldwide web retailer, started its operations as an online bookstore and built 
capabilities such as superior customer service and unique web features on this market before 
expanding to other businesses (Fundinguniverse.com, n.d.; Rivlin, 2005). Such narratives seem 
to indicate that actions adopted by firms to acquire competitive edge might motivate their ulterior 
decisions and choices. The central argument of this dissertation is that competitive actions may 
be important determinants of organizational search and have important effects in strategic 
decision and choice. This logic is consistent with the statement that suggest that “actions taken as 
the result of decisions at one point in time affect the future decisions of the focal organization” 
(Greve & Taylor, 2000: 57); therefore, the present dissertation builds on the idea that competitive 
actions, which are externally directed, specific, and detectable competitive moves deployed by 
the firm with the purpose of improving its competitive position (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; 
Miller and Chen, 1996b; Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, 
MacFhionnlaoich, Smith, and Grimm, 2002; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004), may have an effect on 
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organizational strategy, because they provide knowledge, experience, and resources that affect 
the framework of strategic options for the firm. 
In Aristotelian philosophy, a person becomes who she is through what she does (Kraut, 2016). 
The notion that actions influence long-term behaviors and that the way individuals act has 
important implications on defining who they are and, consequently, the choices they make, is 
also largely accepted by social psychologists (Block, 1971; Caspi, Bem, and Elder, 1989; Caspi 
and Roberts, 2001; Caspi, Elder, and Herbener, 1990). Individuals develop abilities and 
inclinations in part from exposure to situations and experiences (Lerner, 2016). These situations 
and experiences are factors that guide them into becoming who they are. From a practical point 
of view, and as an example, it is discernable that a mountain climber does not start by climbing 
the Everest; instead, it is more plausible that the experience provided by the exposure to less 
challenging environments may determine whether this person will want to pursue more complex 
and difficult climbing activities in the future or continue to engage in the same usual ones. 
Similarly, competitive actions the firm adopts increase exposure to the competitive environment 
guiding the development of long-term strategies. In other words, the firm’s competitive behavior 
may disclose the kind of strategic choices the firm is prepared to undertake at a later time. 
The competitive and cooperative dimensions of the organizational environment entail that 
actions of one firm affect those of another even inadvertently (March, 1996). The focus of 
strategic thought, in particular competitive dynamics, has been mostly on how firms’ actions 
affect their competitors’ behaviors (Chen et al., 1992; Miller and Chen, 1994; Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen, 1996). But like human actions affect both self and others, competitive actions are 
likely to shape the firm and its actual strategy, decisions, and choices. While the value of 
 
 4 
competitive actions as stimulus of organizational choice (Rindova, Ferrier, and Wiltbank, 2010) 
and the influence of competitive behavior in the firm’s strategy (Hambrick et al., 1996; 
Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009; Lamberg, Tikkanen, Nokelainen, and Suur-Inkeroinen, 2009) 
have been mentioned in the literature, no systematic approach to the best of my knowledge has 
so far been taken to examine competitive actions as drivers of strategic choice.  
The present dissertation advances the idea that competitive actions affect firm strategy. First, it 
argues that search processes are closely associated with competitive behavior as they may be 
triggered by action outcomes such as experience and knowledge. Then, it develops the idea that 
competitive actions and their characteristics become the underlying rationale of specific strategic 
choices as they offer to the firm an exposure to the competitive environment that enables the 
generation of a stock of resources that will then predictably influence future choices by revealing 
potential strategic opportunities and narrowing the strategic alternatives available to the firm. 
This research defines a theoretical gap in the literature that examines sources of strategic 
decision and choice by exploring the possibility that strategic choice may derive from 
competitive actions and the experience and knowledge they generate. It also strengthens the link 
between competitive dynamics literature and strategic choice theory by advancing that the effects 
of competitive behavior extend beyond competitors’ analysis and influence the firm’s long-term 
choices.  
Competitive actions may be the most defining of all organizational actions not only because 
firms depend on competitive actions for performance and survival (Lamberg et al., 2009; Derfus, 
Maggitti, Grimm, and Smith, 2008) but also because firms compete through actions (Barnett and 
Hansen, 1996; Ndofor, Sirmon, and He, 2011). Research in competitive dynamics produced a 
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wealth of evidence indicating that the firm’s success and performance may be explained by the 
type, intensity, and quality of its competitive actions and the dynamic interactions they provoke 
(Hambrick et al., 1996). Like human actions that can only be understood in their specific context 
(MacIntyre, 1994), organizational actions connect the firm to its environment (Mutch, Delbridge, 
and Ventresca, 2006). They are an important, if not the main mechanism for loose coupling that 
can be identified as situation drivers of organizational decision-making. People act because they 
perceive the effects of their actions (Hommel, 1998). Likewise, the perception of competitive 
actions’ effects such as the attainment of competitive advantage and performance differentials 
(Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2010; Ndofor et al., 2011) 
determines firm future strategic choice.  
 Besides conveying information about the firm’s competitive position and evoking perceptual 
effects, competitive actions allow firms to learn, engage in search, build experience, and acquire 
knowledge of markets and the interactions therein (Lamberg et al., 2009; Derfus et al., 2008). 
The same way isolated actions we take every day imprint our future behavior, the firm’s 
exposure to the competitive environment through actions leaves a residue of experience and 
knowledge that affects its expectations and future behavior. The residual effect that the firm 
acquires from exposure to the environment is gathered through learning and generates a stock of 
resources such as experience and knowledge; this learning process is not based on reinforcement 
mechanisms and is therefore independent from actual success or failure (Bolles, 1972), but relies 
on singular problem-solving skills that trigger search and can determine future paths or choices 
(Argyris, 1996; Greve and Taylor, 2000). Indeed, competitive dynamics literature found that 
competitive superiority is often achieved through constant and creative competitive activity 
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triggered by the dynamism of competitive environments rather than by the repetitive execution 
of actions (D’Aveni, 1994; Ferrier et al., 1999). 
Competitive actions are tri-dimensional as they assume resource deployment, variety, and time 
(Andrevski, Brass, and Ferrier, 2016). This dissertation predicts that the dimensions of 
competitive actions namely their scope and the number and type of actions adopted by the firm 
through a repertoire shape strategic choice. The number of competitive actions, the scope of 
these actions, and the type of competitive repertoire deployed are dimensions that define how the 
firm is exposed to its competitive environment and allow the generation a particular kind of 
organizational stock, composed of experience and knowledge, that is available to identify 
alternatives for future decisions and choice. This dissertation hypothesizes that the scope of 
competitive actions, which defines the number of different markets and regions the firm is able 
to reach, and the lines of business (Hambrick et al., 1996) and new technologies that the firm is 
able to explore through competitive actions, controls the firm’s competitive exposure. Broad 
competitive exposure generates more valuable experience and knowledge. This experience and 
knowledge may determine then whether the firm can choose related and unrelated diversification 
strategies such as mergers and acquisitions, decide on asset divestment strategies or engage in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
The competitive dynamics scholarship embraces the notion that the competitive environment is 
shaped by innovative interaction among competing firms (Derfus et al., 2008; Schumpeter, 
1976), creating what is famously known as the “perennial gale of creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter, 1976: 89). Authors describe competitive actions as novel given that they are not 
prompted by competitors’ behavior and environmental pressures (MacMillan, 1982; Hambrick et 
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al., 1996; Ndofor et al., 2011), they challenge the market status quo (Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Jacobson, 1992), and they presume the evaluation of alternative options (March and Simon, 
1958; Greve and Taylor, 2000). Generally, research in competitive dynamics was able to link 
creative competitive actions to performance because these actions assume the firm’s awareness 
of new market opportunities and its willingness to evaluate alternative choices (Haleblian, 
McNamara, Kolev, and Dykes, 2012). Through diverse competitive repertoires the firm is in a 
great position to acquire and store different types of experience and knowledge (Miller and 
Chen, 1994, 1996; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ndofor et al., 2011). The assembly and deployment 
of resources required by diverse repertoires of actions indicate the firm’s ability to learn and to 
creatively adapt to shifting and challenging competitive situations (Ndofor et al., 2011) and is 
therefore likely to motivate particular strategic choices. In alignment with this reasoning, I argue 
that the use of diverse repertoires in competitive settings and the exposure it offers to market 
opportunities promotes the acquisition of a stock of resources that increases the set of strategic 
alternatives available to the firm and narrows strategic choice, leading to organizational 
diversification, in particular related diversification, divestitures, or to strategies based on 
innovative solutions to social and environmental issues in the form of corporate social 
responsibility (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008).  
This dissertation seeks to make three contributions. First, it links competitive behavior to 
strategic choice by emphasizing the role of tactical competitive behavior in the context of 
strategic policy. There have been calls to explore in more detail how competitive actions may 
shape firm strategy and accordingly, this study offers a preliminary insight on how firms may 
adopt strategic decisions based on the way they compete.  
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Second, it contributes to competitive dynamics literature by laying the groundwork of a theory of 
competitive action that enlarges the consequences of competitive action beyond its effects on 
competitors and firm performance. It examines specifically how competitive actions generate a 
special kind of organizational stock, composed of experience and knowledge, that impacts 
strategic decisions and choice. Like slack resources allow firms to invest in innovation, 
experimentation, and new strategies (Bourgeois, 1981; Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Lamberg et 
al., 2009), and facilitate competitive activity (Young, Smith, and Grimm, 1996; Ferrier, 2001), 
this stock of experience and knowledge is acquired from exposure to the competitive 
environment through actions and may be used at discretion at a future time. Finally, it provides 
an empirically a general model, grounded on specific observable variables and workable 
hypotheses, that links competitive actions to strategic choice and demonstrates how 
organizational action and competition are instrumental to the adoption of strategic decisions. It 
quantitively demonstrates how the number of actions adopted yearly by the firm, the broadness 
of their impact in terms of geographical markets, innovation, and technology, and the diversity in 







COMPETITIVE ACTIONS AND STRATEGIC CHOICE 
In this chapter I develop the theoretical arguments for the relationships in the model. I briefly 
survey literature on sources of strategic choice and search, and on competitive actions and their 
dimensions. Then I explore in more detail how competitive actions can be the source of strategic 
decisions and choice by evaluating how the adoption of competitive actions and the learning 
opportunities they afford to firms contribute to the generation of a stock of experience and 
knowledge that affects the availability of alternative choices in the strategic process.  
Sources of Strategic Choice  
Apart from acts of nature that are beyond human control, most of the voluntary acts that 
individuals engage in are determined by their choices (Velmans, 2003). Choice links human 
conscientiousness and volition to action (Donagan, 2017; Hodgson, 2005); because individuals 
chose and they are then likely to act on their choices (Donagan, 2017). In their daily lives, 
individuals face mostly insignificant choices, which are processed in an automatic manner; 
however, it is expected that the consequences of some choices are important enough to require 
attention and complex processes of deliberation. Research confirms common sense wisdom that 
decisions that are difficult and important involve more cognitive effort and time than trivial ones 
(Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994; Petty and Wegener, 1998; Sela and Berger, 2012).  The 
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essence of choice has been at the center of the scientific debate for a long time and it is a 
fundamental enquiry in several scientific fields such as philosophy, psychology, economics, and 
neuroscience. While the philosophical discussion centers on whether human choice 
isdeterministic or a result of free will (Velmans, 2003; Hodgson, 2005), in psychology, emphasis 
is given to deviations from rationality and to the psychological biases that infallibly taint human 
choice (cf. Santos and Rosati, 2015). In neo classical economics, individual behavior is 
understood in terms of choice and how the choice of actions is a means to optimally satisfy 
individuals’ needs and goals (Davis, 2003). However, choice is viewed as instrumentally rational 
(Davis, 2003) and its contingency upon profit maximization narrows significantly the number of 
alternatives available to the economic agent (Child, 1997). Still, the notion of perfectly rational 
economic behavior has been consistently challenged by neurological experiments that show how 
economic decisions often depart from the predetermined expectations of the rational model as 
human behavior is guided by different brain functions (Burnham, 2013; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). The exam of the mechanics of choice revealed, for instance, that different parts of the 
brain are involved in automatic or choice dependent valuations and tests found that the 
anticipated reward or cost in a choice, also called subjective value, engages different regions of 
the brain depending on how relevant that subjective value is for choice options (Grueschow et 
al., 2016). For the Austrian school of economics, choice is essentially the result of human action. 
In this perspective, which views entrepreneurship or profit seeking speculation as the force 
behind all economic events, the exercise of deliberate choice and its underlying value judgment 
is the essence of economic behavior (Kirzner, 1997; von Mises, 1949). The phenomenon of 




The relationship between cognition and action is central to organizational thought (Thomas, 
Clark, and Gioia, 1993; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Daft and Weick, 1984; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) and indispensable to understand the processes through which organizations make 
deliberate choices and act on these to thrive. Most organizational theories assume that action 
stems from choice, which can be viewed as the result of expectations and their subjective value, 
as the matching process between the rules of the organization and the demands of the 
environment, or as the result of interactions among organizational actors (March, 1981, 1996; 
Nelson and Winter, 1974). Through cognitive processes that include choice problems, the 
influence of the environment on the organization is interpreted and the issues considered relevant 
are selected to determine organizational action (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Thomas et al., 1993). 
Although human choice may be significantly defined by genetic factors (Hodgson, 2005; 
Ogletree and Oberle, 2008), organizations cannot strictly speaking reclaim similar genetic 
determinism. However, organizational choice is a part of the deliberative processes that are 
imprinted in the organization by its founding members’ previous experience (Eggers and Kaplan, 
2013), it is influenced by the internal values and political processes of negotiation that take place 
within the organization, and it is shaped by the constraints and demands of the environment on 
the organization (Child, 1998; March, 1996). Through choice, organizational cognition is 
transformed into action; cognitive processes based on the firm’s expectations and value systems 
determine search for adequate alternatives that then leads to action (March, 1981; 1996).  
In strategic management, industrial organization economists have shown more concern with the 
need to provide a rational recipe for strategic optimum than with the exam of the effects of 
environmental constraints and demands on the firm’s processes of choice. Under the influence of 
the neo-classical paradigms of perfect information and optimization (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
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Kirzner, 1997) they limit strategic choice to the selection of sets of activities that are exclusive to 
the firm and bound to lead to superior performance (Porter, 1985, 1996; Siggelkow, 2002). In 
their perspective, strategy is a value creation proposition exclusive to the firm that directs the 
firm’s activities towards a particular positioning whose only goal is to guarantee performance 
results above those of the competitors (Porter, 1996; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). 
Accordingly, firms engage in search mainly to choose which activities will outperform those of 
their competitors and choice is equivalent to bundling those activities together in a rational and 
unique way subordinated to performance goals (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Porter, 1996; 
Siggelkow, 2002). Therefore, for industrial organization economics search is a rational 
assessment of the fit between the environment and the firm, and strategic choice equates to the 
firm’s ability to choose activities that create unique value and are potential sources of superior 
performance (Porter, 1996; Bradenburg and Stuart, 1996), with scarce attention being offered to 
the managerial cognitive processes that are behind choice and decision (Gavetti and Rivkin, 
2007).  
For behavioralists, it is cognition that guides the search process and strategic choice. The 
behavioral perspective highlights the centrality of cognitive processes in firm’s activities and 
proposes that the logic and psychology of human choice are behind administrative processes 
(Simon, 1947; Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2012). In contrast with the industrial 
organization theorists for whom strategy is hooked in the firm’s concrete activities, which are the 
core and target of search, the behavioral theory (Cyert and March, 1963) emphasizes the role of 
human cognition in the choice process (Cyert and March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012) and extends 
the limits of rational choice to include alternative rationality rules such as satisficing, or selecting 
the first alternative deemed satisfactory by the decision maker (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 
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1978; Gavetti et al., 2012). By challenging the core assumptions of classic economic theory and 
introducing bounded rationality in organizational processes, the behavioral perspective makes 
search a “sine qua non” condition in the choice process (Gavetti et al., 2012; Cyert and March, 
1963). In this framework search and choice become interdependent (Cyert and March, 1963); 
search is active, problem driven, and akin to a discovery process and choice implies the 
estimation of alternatives that are rationally bounded due to the limited cognitive power of the 
decision maker (March, 1981) and the absence of “complete knowledge and anticipation of the 
consequences that will follow on each choice” (Simon, 1947: 81). Therefore, and given bounded 
rationality, only a fraction of choice alternatives is available to managers (Gavetti et al., 2012) 
and the complexity of choosing the most satisficing alternative requires that they attempt to 
sensibly anticipate the potential consequences of their choices (Simon, 1947; March, 1978; 
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti et al., 2012). Although the behavioral perspective spawned 
several explanations on the source and process of strategic choice, its main problem remains how 
to choose the best course of action, given the constraints imposed on the decision maker and the 
presence of numerous and at times conflicting goals within the organization. 
Strategic management scholarship based on the behavioral framework emphasizes the 
importance of flexible managerial reasoning in organizational choices and in the strategic 
decision process (Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers, 1998; Gavetti et al., 2012) and proposes 
that the cognitive essence of strategic choice is bounded rational foresight through which it is 
possible to roughly predict the consequences of alternative choices (Gavetti et al., 2012). For 
behavioral theorists, strategy includes the selection of both major organizational directions and 
minor competition-oriented actions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and is affected by the 
managerial representation of the firm’s competitive environment (Gavetti et al., 2012). Within 
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the boundaries of the cognition-based strategic thought, the upper echelons perspective 
specifically ascertains that strategy reflects top management values and cognitive bases 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In this perspective strategic choice and decision are the outcome 
of the cognitive skills of top executives and are shaped by their particular background 
demographic characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In the behavioral tradition, thus, 
cognitive processes are behind choice. Other authors focus on strategic choice that is driven by 
external events and influenced by environmental forces (Bateman & Zeithalm, 1989).  
Organizations seek intelligence through planning, economizing, and analyzing (March, 2006); 
they are viewed as powerful agents of deliberate rational choice whose performance and survival 
are intrinsically dependent upon their choices. In the organizational context, therefore, choice is 
presumed to be as thoughtful and as rational as possible given the information available to the 
decision maker. However, human decisions including those that involve economic goals often 
deviate from rationality parameters (Santos and Rosati, 2015). Psychological biases such as 
framing and the selection of irrelevant information (Santos and Rosati, 2015) affect choice and 
decision-making processes. Managerial decisions, in particular, are frequently shaped by 
feedback and escalation of commitment; managers are more likely to choose strategies that 
reinforce past decisions due to their bias towards self-justification and the need to rationally 
justify previous choices (Bateman and Zeithalm, 1989). Studies found that individuals use 
heuristics to simplify their decision-making process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and the 
availability heuristics is often used to assess how easily certain associations can be recalled by 
the mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Managers are likely to use readily available 
information that was collected in their minds through recent experiences to make decisions or 
 
 15
choose. Strategic choice is then an outcome of cognitive processes that are influenced by the 
psychological biases of the decision maker and environmental feedback.  
Strategic choice can also be understood as the result of a dynamic search process that ties the 
cognition mechanisms that interpret and shape the relationship between the firm and its 
environment to the activities over which search occurs (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Thietart, 
2015). In this perspective, the temporal dimension embedded in the dynamic forces that 
influence both managerial cognition and the firm’s search activities will have a particular and 
recognizable effect on strategic choice (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007).  
A survey of literature on sources of strategy indicates that strategic choice is theoretically framed 
as a result of managerial cognition (Gavetti et al., 2012; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), is 
embodied in bundles of activities placed together to achieve a positioning goal and superior 
performance (Porter, 1996; Ghemawat and Rivkin, 1999; Siggelkow, 2001, 2002; Gavetti and 
Rivkin, 2007), or is the outcome of search processes that combine both managerial cognition and 
organizational actions synchronized in time (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). For most economic and 
organizational theories choice is a determinant of action (cf. March, 1996; von Mises, 1949). 
Action is conceptualized as strategic action resulting from planning and deliberation. These 
models of organizational choice are largely based on planning that is intended to circumvent the 
fact that reality is unpredictable, unstable, and ambiguous while accepting that there are internal 
and external constraints on decision making (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1978). Given that 
expectations may be frustrated by unforeseen events and that preferences change, some point out 
that actions are likely sources of new organizational objectives as actions’ effects result in the 
development of new preferences and new intentions (March, 1981). If that is the case, actions 
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enable firms to redesign and readapt organizational goals and preferences and may become 
determinants of organizational choice by facilitating new behavior. Authors assert that 
organizational action influences and alters the interpretation, evaluation, and the value of future 
alternatives and is the source of changes in decision making processes (Greve and Taylor, 2000; 
Weick, 1990).   
In this dissertation, I advance the idea that competitive actions influence managerial choice by 
exposing the firm to the environment and generating experience and knowledge resources that 
are likely to affect managerial decision-making processes. Experience and knowledge gathered 
through environmental exposure will impact managerial choice by uncovering psychological 
biases in choice as individuals are likely to make choices based on previous and more salient 
experiences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).  
Authors stressed how competitive actions are important to firm strategy (Hambrick et al., 1996). 
I posit that tactical competitive actions may direct strategic choice as they expose firms to their 
competitive environment, thereby influencing future firm behavior, opening the way to new 
strategic directions, and impelling the discovery of new alternatives for strategic choice. 
Search Resulting from Action 
Choice implies alternatives and the ranking of these alternatives. The choice or selection of a 
strategy assumes a previous search for alternatives because not all alternatives are readily 
available to the decision maker (Cyert and March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012). The organizational 
process of search may be regarded as a process of inquiry in which choice is the match between 
the best alternative and the strategic goal. Search and choice are part of the organizational 
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decision process (Argyris, 1976) that is activated by problems and the need to solve them (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). These problems exist objectively (Lai and 
Grønhaug, 1994; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013), are waiting to be discovered (Eggers and Kaplan, 
2013), or are constructed by managerial decisions (Agre, 1982; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). 
However, actions conceived either as exploratory means to detect opportunities (Eggers and 
Kaplan, 2013; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gavetti, 2005; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005; 
Gavetti, 2012) and build new capabilities (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013) or as improvisational 
responses based on previous experience and skills can also be triggers of organizational search 
(Gavetti, 2005). The efficacy of the decision-making process is dependent on information 
collected from previous actions and environmental feedback that is absorbed by the organization 
through learning mechanisms (Argyris, 1976). Accordingly, both previous actions and feedback 
from the environment contain the information necessary for search and choice.  
Models of organizational search are based on different theoretical perspectives and assumptions. 
Search, in the behavioral tradition, is an adaptation process that synchronizes the aspiration 
levels of the organization with its performance goals such that performance below certain levels 
will prompt search for solutions to level that differential (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and 
March, 1981). In the behavioral framework, search results from failure to attain goals (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012) or from success that guarantees availability of slack (March, 
1981; Tyler and Caner, 2016; Chen, 2008; Chen and Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003). In this 
perspective, slack is valuable to the firm because it amounts to a stock of resources that exceeds 
those needed for the continuing operations of the firm (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986) and that 
might have been committed to some other organizational goal (Levinthal and March, 1981). If 
the firm has an excess of resources that can be diverted to activities different than the usual, then 
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the firm will be able to engage in a wider search, one that is not centered around the solution for 
the problem of meeting failed aspirations or performance shortfalls but is instead aimed to 
broader strategic goals (George, 2005; Voss, Sirdesmukh, and Voss, 2008; Kuusela, Keil, and 
Maula, 2016). Therefore, this stock of available resources or slack gives the firm freedom of 
choice by allowing a search that is not reasonably justified by specific problems or normal 
activities (Levinthal and March, 1981; Troilo, De Luca, and Atuahene-Gima, 2013) but may 
nevertheless be necessary to the achievement of strategic goals.  
In this dissertation, I suggest that outcomes of action such as experience and knowledge may 
prompt a search that is similar to slack search. Slack resources allow firms to engage in a distal 
search, a type of search that is carried out outside the firm’s usual area of business (Cyert and 
March, 1963) and results in a wider range of available alternatives. When a firm is exposed to 
the environment through its actions, it is predictable that this exposure will have consequences 
on the firm’s behavior. Previous research suggests that firms engage in search, action, and 
learning because competition is dynamic and requires constant action and innovation to attain 
performance results (Derfus et al., 2008; Barnett and McKendrick, 2004). This research indicates 
that competitive environments stimulate learning because firms compete for superior 
performance by engaging in competitive interaction with their rivals (Derfus et al., 2008). I 
propose that competitive actions expose the firm to the competitive environment and this 
exposure generates a stock of experience and knowledge in the firm. Experience and knowledge 
are absorbed through learning and determine search. This search is discretionary and proactive, 
and in that manner similar to slack search, because it is rooted in the availability of excess 
resources of experience and knowledge.  As the domain of search becomes wider, an increased 
number of alternatives, more varied and complex, will be available for the firm. Previous 
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research in organizational learning distinguishes between passive search that is situated within 
the limits of managerial schemes and confirms previous biases, and active search that relies on 
exceptional interpretations of problems that lead to new strategies (Greve and Taylor, 2002; 
Argyris, 1996). In the perspective adopted in this dissertation, outcomes of action such as 
experience and knowledge are combined into a pool of resources that affects the type of search 
the firm undertakes and the results of that search. Here actions prompt search and are then likely 
to influence choice and shape future strategic behavior. 
Competitive Actions as Source of Search and Strategic Choice 
Firms that face competition need to act (Barnett and Hansen, 1996) and competitive actions, 
which are the firm’s response to its competitive environment prompt search, new actions, and 
learning (Derfus et al., 2008). Competitive actions have a dual role for the firm: they are 
elements of adaptation and elements of change. As elements of adaptation, actions facilitate the 
firm’s adjustment to the existing conditions of the competitive environment and to competitors’ 
challenges. As elements of change, they introduce new terms of competitive engagement, disrupt 
market conditions by creating pressure on competitors, and influence shifts in competitive 
positioning (Chen et al., 1992; Chen and Miller, 1994; Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Lamberg et 
al., 2009; Chen, Katila, McDonald, and Eisenhardt, 2010). In order to adapt to a competitive 
environment in an effective way and to be able to exert influence upon it, firms need to make 
choices that are congruent with their strategic goals.  
Core to the competitive dynamics research and the Austrian school philosophy is the ability of 
competitive actions to disrupt the competitive environment, creating competitive advantages for 
some firms and weakening the competitive position of others (Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999; 
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Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2010). The rivalry assumption in competitive dynamics is 
grounded on the power of tactical competitive actions, which are specific, purposeful, and visible 
moves designed to build an advantage to the firm and to provoke responses from competitors 
(Smith et al., 1991).  Tactical competitive actions are easy to deploy because they imply less 
resource and effort commitment from the firm than strategic actions, but these properties also 
make them less stable as they are generally easier to imitate, inviting more retaliation from rival 
firms (Smith et al., 1991; Chen et al., 1992; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, and Hitt, 2010). Studies 
found that certain action characteristics such as timing, speed, and intensity are related with 
competitive advantage and lead to above average performance (Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier, 
2001; Nadkarni, Chen, and Chen, 2016). Although the competitive dynamics literature has 
focused on competitive actions mainly as sources of performance (Young et al., 1996; Grimm, 
Lee, and Smith, 2006; Chen et al., 2010), this dissertation develops the argument that 
competitive actions are coordinated and unified by strategic goals (He, Mahoney, and Wang, 
2009; Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a) and affect strategic choice. Researchers acknowledge that 
tactical competitive actions are not only the building blocks of the firm’s competitive behavior 
but also important motivators of firm strategy (Hambrick et al., 1996; He et al., 2009). In sum, 
through tactical competitive actions, firms are able to compete successfully, influence their 
competitive context, and define strategic objectives that are coherent with their competitive 
behavior. 
Competitive Action as Information. Competitive actions are visible in the market (Chen and 
Miller, 1994; Chen and Hambrick, 1995; He et al., 2009; Ndofor et al., 2011) and can convey 
information about the firm to market participants and to the firm’s internal and external 
stakeholders (Smith et al., 1991; Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Rindova et al., 2010). Authors 
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remark that firms observe other firms’ behaviors to establish their roles in the market (White, 
1981; Miller and Chen, 1996b), and organizational actions in general convey information about 
the firm (Greve and Taylor, 2000). Researchers showed how in nascent markets competitive 
actions function as ambiguity reduction mechanisms that provide information cues to market 
participants about the firm’s strategy (Rindova et al., 2010) and how language used in 
competitive settings by rival firms affects actions and market relationships (Rindova, Becerra, 
and Contardo, 2004). They suggest that competitive advantage results both from resource 
deployment and exchange and the interpretations and communications among firm stakeholders 
about this exchange (Rindova et al., 1992; Rindova and Fombrun, 1999). Additionally, there is 
evidence that firms rely on the interpretation of past competitive actions to evaluate their 
competitive position and decide on their future behavior (Lamberg et al., 2009; Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen, 1997).  
Characteristics of competitive actions disclose the firm’s competitive intentions and allow 
competitors to decipher what type of behavior to expect from the firm. For instance, the use of 
aggressive actions, that are fast, intense, and resource consuming (Yu, Subramaniam, and 
Cannella, 2009; Nadkarni et al., 2016), is highly visible in the competitive arena and likely to 
leave an impression on competitors and customers. Likewise, the scope of a competitive action 
indicates to the market how many of its resources the firm is willing to employ toward the goal 
of acquiring competitive advantage and how its operations might be affected by the move 
(Hambrick et al., 1996; Chen and MacMillan, 1992). For instance, the opening of an 800,000 
square-foot high tech service center using advanced robotics by Amazon in 2016 can be seen as a 
competitive action of broad scope that signals that the firm is aiming to consolidate leadership in 
the retail industry (Nickelsburg, 2016). The competitive repertoire of the firm communicates to 
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the firm’s competitors and its customers that the firm possesses a specific portfolio of 
competition moves (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Chen and 
Miller, 2012), which is an effective way to encourage or discourage competition. Diverse 
repertoires are difficult to imitate and indicate that the firm is proficient in adapting to 
environmental changes, a condition that is likely to discourage rivals’ responses (Miller & Chen, 
1996a); on the other hand, simple repertoires, especially in active competitive environments, 
communicate the firm’s focus on a limited number of goals, are easy to imitate, and therefore 
encourage competitors’ responses (Miller and Chen, 1996a). 
Competitive Action as Innovative Behavior. Competitive dynamics scholarship characterizes the 
nature of the initial competitive action as novel behavior (Hambrick et al., 1996; MacMillan, 
1982) that challenges the market status quo (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Jacobson, 1992). Competitive actions can be narrow or broad in scope (Hambrick et al., 1996). 
Actions with narrow scope are incremental, easy to implement, and require strictly the necessary 
amount of resources and capabilities for the firm to compete at adequate level (Smith et al., 
1991). These actions are based on comparable attributes (MacMillan, McCaffery, and Van Wijk, 
1985; Chen et al., 1992; Hambrick et al., 1996) and although they introduce some disruption in 
the market and potential change in competitive positions, they are less resource intensive, require 
less commitment, and limit search to the extant competition domain. An important premise of the 
competitive dynamics literature is that initiating actions are predictive of competitors’ responses 
and research results show that the scope, the intensity, and the implementation requirements of 
competitive actions affect the number and the timing of rivals’ responses (Smith et al., 1989; 
Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992). Significantly researchers found that tactical 
actions are more likely to determine tactical responses from competitors (Smith et al., 1991). For 
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example, when a firm decides on a price cut to obtain competitive advantage, this move is likely 
to prompt a competitor’s price cut, because this tactical action is easy to interpret and imitate, 
and a retaliatory price cut is adequate to undermine at least temporarily the competitive 
advantage of the initiating firm (Smith et al., 1991).  
In competitive environments, however, firms may be motivated to adopt actions that go beyond 
usual, “small change” competitive behavior. Firms may be compelled to adopt tactical 
competitive actions that create a stronger and more permanent competitive advantage, 
undermining their competitors’ ability to develop such advantage quickly (Rindova et al., 2010; 
Chen et al., 2010) and enabling the firm to achieve complete market dominance. These 
competitive actions are inherently novel and initiated by the firm as a result of their own internal 
search processes and creativity sources; they are not prompted by competitors’ behavior 
(Hambrick et al., 1996), and they determine change in the firm’s set of capabilities, technologies, 
products and services (Greve and Taylor, 2000). Behavioral theorists explain the adoption of 
such novel, non-imitative actions as the result of wider search processes. Indeed, in the 
behavioral perspective search is characterized as a discovery process that may lead to innovation 
(Greve and Taylor, 2000; Gavetti et al., 2012). Researchers in this tradition found that low 
performance levels led firms to adopt imitative actions (Massini, Lewin, and Greve, 2005; 
Schwab, 2007; Gavetti et al., 2012) while low performance coupled with organizational slack 
generated innovative behavior (Salge, 2011, Gavetti et al., 2012). Recent empirical studies in 
competitive dynamics confirm that successful firms often engage in innovative competitive 
behavior through R&D actions. Their results demonstrated that high performing firms adopt 
more R&D competitive moves and that the adoption of these moves allows them to obtain extra 
knowledge about the market and competitors (Chen et al., 2010).  
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Initiating actions indicate innovative behavior because they presume learning processes, suggest 
alternative options, and provoke changes in managerial cognition (March and Simon, 1958; 
Greve and Taylor, 2000). In the competitive dynamics literature, in tune with the Austrian 
perspective, authors compare the adoption of new competitive actions to innovation and offer as 
an example the original frequent flyer program created by American Airlines in the aviation 
industry (Hambrick et al., 1996). Recent research found that in the pharmaceutical industry the 
adoption of novel competitive actions is promoted by the availability of technological resources 
that insulate the firm from mimetic behavior (Ndofor et al., 2011). Also, given that these novel 
actions are radical, complex, visible and can be perceived as a threat, they are likely to challenge 
rival firms’ operative and managerial processes and affect their responses (MacMillan et al., 
1985). Novel actions introduce new elements in the competitive arena that are similar to 
innovation, so much so that they may be deemed inconceivable by the firm’s rivals in certain 
circumstances (Ndofor et al, 2011) because innovation presumes knowledge that is private to its 
creators (Greve and Taylor, 2000). In this dissertation I suggest that the element of novelty 
introduced by competitive actions changes the conversation inside the firm and among market 
participants. In the market, these actions modify the competitive environment as firms shift to 
different competitive positions. They also enable their creators to reach other market participants. 
Depending on the breadth of the disruption and the depth of its effects, some rival firms may be 
driven to abandon the market. Within the firm, the implementation of such novel competitive 
actions opens discussions about alternative competitive strategies and encourages the 
development of new resource bundling and capabilities (Ndofor et al, 2011). Innovative actions 
stimulate managerial cognition and learning, and encourage awareness to new opportunities, 
which in the competitive environment are potential sources of competitive advantage (Nadkarni 
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et al., 2016). Innovation increases the number of alternatives available to the decision maker 
(March and Simon, 1958) affecting the boundaries of organizational choice (Greve and Taylor, 
2000). The introduction of a new product or the expansion of product lines with new features 
will define new technological and competitive standards that expose more alternatives and 
stimulate new ways of competing. For example, the commercial release of the iPod by Apple in 
the early 2000s changed radically the music industry standards with the introduction of 
groundbreaking features at a time when other available music playing devices were still using 
controls better suited for the “defunct” Sony “Walkman” (Hormby, 2013). Therefore, by creating 
new market conditions, introducing new standards, and exposing the firm to a new competitive 
environment, competitive actions are likely to influence the firm’s strategic choice. 
Competitive Action and Learning. Competitive actions, defined as externally oriented, specific, 
and detectable moves adopted by firms to obtain competitive advantages (Chen et al., 1992; 
Miller and Chen, 1996b; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002), are mechanisms used by the firm to 
adapt to the competitive environment and respond to both internal and external demands. The 
competitive dynamics literature acknowledges that competitive actions provide learning 
opportunities for the firm (Derfus et al., 2008; Ndofor et al., 2011). Organizational learning is an 
adaptive process that enables the continuing adjustment between the firm and its environment 
(Levinthal and Marino, 2015; Child, 1997) and this process is facilitated by the social 
interactions on which the firm relies to operate and by the social knowledge that is embedded in 
its rules and principles (Kogut and Zander, 1996), therefore affecting organizational action.  
In the organizational framework, learning is environmentally dependent and geared towards 
“what the firm can do” (Kogut and Zander, 1976). Learning is generated both through the firm’s 
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direct experience that is encoded in its memory as routines and tacit knowledge, and through 
benchmarking, that entails comparisons with rival firms (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Firms can 
therefore learn and acquire relevant knowledge from their own experience or from the 
experiences of others. In the competitive dynamics literature, studies found that firms learn from 
rivals (Rivkin, 2000; Csaszar and Siggelkow, 2009; Chen et al., 2010) and that rivals’ search 
processes influence search within the firm (Katila and Chen, 2008; Katila, Bahceci, and 
Miikkulainen, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). In certain circumstances, when there is reliable 
environmental information available to predict future needs and preferences in the market 
(Pisano, 1994; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991), firms can also “learn before doing” by stipulating 
plans and programs to generate useful and applied knowledge (Pisano, 1994).  
A central premise of this dissertation is that firms learn from their own experience or “learn by 
doing”, particularly when they do not possess all the information necessary to predict the effects 
of their own actions (Pisano, 1994; Argote, 1999; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). Research found 
that competition in dynamic environments influences the firm’s learning capacity and the 
acquisition of competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 1994). This research 
supports the main argument of this dissertation that competitive actions and the exposure to the 
competitive environment they provide allow firms to learn while competing (Ndofor et al., 2011) 
and that the outcome of this learning process, a stock of experience and knowledge, can be used 
by the firm to assess new opportunities and narrow its future strategic choice. 
Authors state that learning and adaptation are requirements of effective organizational action 
(Argote, 1999; Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988; March and Olsen, 
1976; March and Simon, 1958; Levinthal and Marino, 2015). To understand the process through 
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which actions as mechanisms of learning and adaptation influence the firm’s choices and 
behavior it is necessary to assume that the firm is an entity whose plasticity, or capacity to adapt 
to environmental conditions (Levinthal and Marino, 2015), has implications on future behavior. 
Such perspective diverges from a view that represents the firm as rigid and non-plastic, with 
adaptive processes that depend mainly on reinforced behavior executed through rules and 
routines (Nelson, 1994; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). Research in management found that 
organizational plasticity, defined as the firm’s capacity to adapt its policies according to the 
feedback obtained from previous actions (Lave and March, 1975; Levinthal and Marino, 2015), 
enables a better coordination between organizational policies and environmental feedback, and 
that in dynamic environments in particular, higher levels of plasticity that rely on less routinized 
behavior are more effective (Levinthal and Marino, 2015). In neuroscience, plasticity is the brain 
capacity to balance between adaptability that determines learning and stability that maintains 
abilities and memories (Merzenich, Van Vleet, and Nahum, 2014). Experiments showed that the 
brain physiology changes in areas that are related with the acquisition of knowledge and skills 
obtained through actions (Maguire, Woolett, and Spiers, 2006; Hüfner et al., 2010). 
In organizational theory, authors stress that innovative actions are sources of learning through 
which the set of choices available to the firm is amplified (Greve and Taylor, 2000). Based on 
this idea that learning acquired through action impacts the mindsets of individuals, I suggest in 
this dissertation that competitive actions, through a process that replicates the way learned 
behavior impacts the brain’s functioning and structure, allow firms to acquire experience and 
knowledge that is likely to determine and shape their future behavior and structure. Competitive 
actions, as sources of learning and innovation that is based on new experience and knowledge, 
disclose new opportunities for the firm and influence the strategic choices of the firm. These may 
 
 28
include diversification and divestitures, which are decisions that impact the structure of the firm, 
or its “physiology”. 
Effects of Learning from Competitive Actions on Strategic Choice 
Previously, I explored the notion that competitive actions transmit information, indicate 
innovative behavior, and are the basis for organizational learning. In this section, I examine the 
process through which competitive actions expose firms to their competitive environment and 
how this exposure activates learning by creating resources that influence strategic behavior. 
Firms are communities of knowledge that facilitate coordination, communication, and adaptation 
(Pisano, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1996). By encapsulating the firm’s intentions, motivations, 
and goals (March, 1981), organizational actions trigger search to generate knowledge (Eggers 
and Kaplan, 2013). In the behavioral or evolutionary point of view, organizational choice relies 
on learning as a necessary mechanism of search given that this perspective challenges the 
rational assumption of optimization and depends on managerial decision for satisficing solutions 
(Argote, 1999; Chen et al., 2010; Gavetti et al., 2012). The behavioral perspective tends to 
emphasize a type of search that is problem driven. Indeed, some describe organizational learning 
as a solving problem process prompted by performance shortfalls (Von Hippel and Tyre, 1993; 
Dosi and Marengo, 1993, Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Pisano, 1994). Learning viewed as problem 
solving relies on search that is single minded and local, which implies that solutions and 
alternatives are found the vicinity of the problem (Cyert and March, 1963; Chen et al., 2010). In 
the traditional competitive dynamics framework where performance is the sought-after effect of 
competitive behavior, managers engage in local search in their attempts to solve performance 
shortcomings (Chen et al., 2010). In the present research, however, I suggest that competitive 
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behavior influences strategic choice. When considering future strategies managers are likely to 
engage in wider and deeper search processes that look beyond the vicinity of problems. As stated 
previously, search prompted by the availability of experience and knowledge resources can be 
compared to slack search. Slack search, in the behavioral framework, is adaptive and mindless, 
unlikely to be approved in times of scarcity or resource constraint, and economically unjustified 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1981). Slack search promotes innovative 
behavior (Bourgeois, 1981; Troilo et al., 2013), suggesting that the firm is looking for 
information to build knowledge that is beyond its current level (Troilo et al., 2013; Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002). In sum, competitive actions expose the firm to the environment and that exposure 
prompts a type of search that is not rooted in specific performance problems but instead in the 
availability of particular resources such as experience and knowledge. This search is likely to 
lead to the discovery of new opportunities, and therefore influences strategic choice.  
Learning and Choice. Organizational behavior is mostly learned behavior that reacts to 
environmental feedback (March, 2006). Evolutionary learning assumes that organizations 
acquire knowledge through the accumulation of experience from which they are able to derive 
heuristics or rules of thumb that simplify the deliberative phase of the decision process and let 
the organization deal with uncertainty in an effective way (Pisano, 1994; March, 1981). This 
model of learning is adaptive as it relies on the replication of success and generation of variety 
(March, 2006). It is predicated in reinforced learning mechanisms where the value of actions is 
determined by a consistent sequence of action trials that leads to the behavioral change 
(Thorndike, 1911; Gershman et al., 2016). Actions are reinforced by rewards or punishments that 
together with the influence of other relevant stimuli determine subsequent actions (Cowie and 
Davison, 2016; Skinner, 1969). The value of the action is estimated from experience, which 
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determines the probabilistic choice of future actions; a positively reinforced action is more likely 
to be repeated and a negative one more likely to be ignored (Gershman et al., 2016).  
Similar to reinforcement processes that are based on historical comparisons (Gillan et al., 2016), 
models of organizational search and choice involve comparison between sequences of 
organizational actions and feedback from the environment that provide the information necessary 
for adopting subsequent behavior (Argyris, 1976). Reinforced learning makes future behavior 
contingent on the effects of actions (Thorndike, 1911; Cowie and Davison, 2016); likewise, 
evolutionary models of organizational search and choice stipulate that firms learn from action 
(March, 1981) and following the reinforcement principle (Thorndike, 1911), actions that are 
successful are more likely to be repeated (March 1991, 2006; Levinthal and March, 1993; Greve 
and Taylor, 2000). Therefore, through successful and consistent actions firms acquire experience 
(Lamberg et al., 2009) and knowledge of “how things work” (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Lamberg et al., 2009). In the evolutionary paradigm, consistent repetition builds experience and 
knowledge that are encapsulated in organizational rules and routines (March, 1991; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Levinthal and March, 1993) and guide present and future behavior (March, 1981; 
Levitt and March, 1988).  
In this dissertation, I suggest that firms may also acquire knowledge and experience through a 
different learning mechanism. Authors have suggested that firms learn from a diversity of 
sources. For example, firms can reclaim a build-in mechanism of learning or “genetic” 
propensity to behave in a certain way. Studies show that firms’ behaviors are conspicuously 
influenced by the experience and knowledge of their founding and early members (Burton, 
Sorensen, and Beckman, 2002; Gong, Baker, and Miner, 2005; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005, 
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Shane and Khurana, 2003; Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). Others have challenged the prevalence of 
reinforced systems and suggested that firms learn by identification (Bandura and Walters, 1963; 
Kogut and Zander, 1996) or through membership in communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 
1991; Kogut and Zander, 1996). Authors remark that by mere access to information firms may 
increase their recognition of opportunities and ideas for new competitive actions (Andrevski et 
al., 2016). Organizational learning has traditionally depended upon successful action that 
controls the likelihood of incorporation of experience and knowledge in organizational systems, 
determining imitation, performance or survival (March, 2006).  
The present dissertation theorizes that firms “learn while acting” and acquire experience and 
knowledge by exposure to the competitive environment rather than from persistent trials. Firms 
learn by analyzing how their competitive actions affect the market and their competitors and then 
assess the results of the exposure to particular market conditions in a manner that is similar to 
experiential learning. Experiential learning is based on active involvement in specific learning 
experiences, the analytical assessment of these experiences, and the application of decision-
making and problem-solving skills to use the ideas acquired through the experiences in later 
situations (Kolb, 1984). In the competitive dynamics literature there are suggestions that the 
dynamism of the competitive environment is more likely to influence successful firms than the 
repetition of competitive actions (D’Aveni, 1994; Ferrier et al., 1999). Researchers in this field 
argue that firms learn new ways to compete both from previous experience and from observing 
the current conditions in the market (Miller and Chen, 1994). Studies found that firms that 
employ diverse action repertoires are more exposed to the market idiosyncrasies and therefore 
are able to obtain more information about their customers and competitors (Miller and Chen, 
1996a; Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991) and more feedback from the competitive environment 
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(Miller and Chen, 1996a). Some scholars mention how firms that compete in market niches are 
exposed to a variety of behaviors and unorthodox ideas (Burt, 1987; Erickson, 1988; Miller and 
Chen, 1996b) that influence their future behavior (Miller, 1993; Chen and Miller, 1994; Miller 
and Chen, 1996b), while others suggest that an exposure to diverse environmental contexts 
facilitates learning though iterative comparisons and improves the firm’s flexibility (Ndofor et 
al., 2011).  
The exposure to the competitive environment through actions and the ability to effectively assess 
the consequences and effects of these actions create a residual effect that is stored by the firm as 
experience and knowledge. All knowledge acquired by the firm is maintained and accumulates 
within the firm’s systems to be used whenever needed even when its source or history is no 
longer identified (March, 1978). Hence, the residual knowledge that results from competitive 
actions and the environmental exposure they afford is likely to impact future organizational 
choices, just like seemingly isolated actions we take every day can leave an imprint in our 
behavior and determine future decisions. Research in psychology found that mind or 
psychological resources such as optimism, sense of personal control, and the ability to find 
meaning in experiences act as reserves that not only enable individuals to deal with difficult 
events and the vicissitudes of life (Taylor, 1983) but also promote better choices (Frankl, 1963; 
Seligman, 1998, Taylor, 1989; Taylor et al., 2000). I contend that experience and knowledge 
retained from exposure to the competitive environment build a stock of resources that firms can 




Decision-making processes are tainted by psychological bias. Firms’ exposure to the 
environment through action generates resources for the firm that are valuable in future choice; 
the experience that managers collect in this process is likely to remain salient in future occasions. 
A variety of studies in different fields of knowledge such as marine biology and energy 
consumer behavior has examined the effects of the availability bias in decision-making (for 
example, Liedtka, 2015; Frederiks et al., 2015). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that 
decision makers overvalue options that are easy for them to imagine and a number of studies 
have identified various situations in which decision making is influenced by recent experiences 
and similar cases (Liedtka, 2015; Frederiks et al., 2015). These studies, that range from 
consumer behavior to marine mammal surveys, confirm that individuals rely on instantly 
available information that is easily and quickly accessible when making a decision. I propose 
that experience and knowledge collected through action in the competitive environment is likely 
to influence managers’ processes of choice by narrowing the available alternatives. 
In sum, a firm that possesses a pool or stock of experience and knowledge in certain markets is 
likely to undertake strategic choices such as diversification or corporate social responsibility. 
This stock of resources may be deployed in a manner that is similar to the use of slack resources 
by firms. In behavioral theory, slack is an important determinant of firm behavior (Chen and 
Miller, 2007; Chen, 2008; Greve, 2003; Tyler and Caner, 2016). The availability of slack 
resources determines the type of actions a firm is able to undertake (Kuusela et al., 2016) and 
may be used at different occasions. For example, slack may function as a buffer that protects the 
firm in case of performance difficulties (George, 2005) or as an extra supply of resources that 
offers flexibility and freedom to act and can be deployed to implement strategic actions (Kuusela 
et al., 2016).  
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Like slack resources that offer leeway for firms to implement strategic activities (Bourgeois, 
1981; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, and Tansik, 1988) and adopt strategic innovation (Nohria and 
Gulati, 1996; Danneels, 2008; 2013), the experience and knowledge that the firm gathers through 
competitive actions is likely to narrow the strategic alternatives open to the firm as it prompts 
information that is readily available and quickly accessible from previous environmental 
exposure. In the next chapter I examine how characteristics of competitive actions such as scope, 
and the repertoire of actions deployed by the firm contribute to the creation of a stock of 
resources such as experience and knowledge that narrows strategic choice and influences the 
adoption of strategies such as organizational diversification, both related and unrelated, 








THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITIVE ACTIONS’ CHARACTERISTICS ON 
DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES, DIVESTITURES, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  
In this chapter of the dissertation, I develop a set of hypotheses that will test how the scope of 
competitive actions and the firm’s repertoire of competitive actions are determinants of strategic 
choices such as organizational diversification, related and unrelated diversification, divestitures, 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Additionally, I hypothesize that organizational slack is 
likely to moderate the association between action scope and repertoire and diversification. 
Finally, I hypothesize that slack moderates the association between action scope and repertoire 
and CSR. 
Competitive actions 
A core argument in competitive dynamics is that the firm’s financial performance depends on 
how the firm’s competitors respond to its competitive actions (Chen et al., 1992; Miller and 
Chen, 1994; Hambrick et al., 1996; Ketchen, Snow, and Hoover, 2004; Tsai, Su, and Chen, 
2011). Research in competitive dynamics emphasizes the role of competitive actions in the 
creation of competitive advantage (Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 
2010) and explores how the characteristics of competitive actions generate financial performance 
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by influencing competitors’ responses (Smith et al., 1991; Chen and Miller, 1994; Miller and 
Chen, 1996; Derfus et al., 2008; Ndofor et al., 2011). Specifically, studies reveal that actions 
with broad scope and action repertoires are efficient ways for the firm to protect its competitive 
advantage, as they elicit few and slow responses from competitors (Smith et al., 1989; Chen et 
al., 1992) and contribute to the erosion of competitors’ market share and the dethronement of 
market leaders (Ferrier et al., 1999). The present dissertation shifts the attention from 
performance results to the effects of competitive actions on strategic choice by investigating how 
specific characteristics of actions may lead to the adoption of strategies such as diversification, 
divestitures, and CSR.  
This research explores the possibility that strategic choice is influenced by the firm’s market 
exposure and by learning mechanisms that create a stock of experience and knowledge resources 
for the firm. The amount of such resources and their salience and availability is likely then to 
narrow the set of available alternatives for strategic choice. Overall, it predicts that a stock of 
experience and knowledge acquired through competition will affect the firm’s growth by 
encouraging the exploitation of current capabilities and the acquisition of new ones through 
diversification or will lead, under certain circumstances, to the divestiture of some of the firm’s 
assets. Other possible strategic direction stemming from competitive actions is the adoption of 
CSR initiatives. 
Action scope 
Competitive dynamics traditionally refers to the scope of a competitive action as the amount of 
resources the firm deploys in a particular competitive move or, in other words, to the proportion 
of resources the firm spends in a particular action to gain and sustain an advantage over its 
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competitors (Hambrick et al., 1996). The amount of resources involved in a competitive action 
determines therefore how pervasive the action is because it is likely that larger resource 
deployments reach a larger number of competitors (Chen et al., 1992). Actions with broad scope 
indicate that the firm is competitively bold because they involve significant resource 
deployments that have major impact on the firm’s operations, thereby setting the firm apart from 
other firms that pursue more conservative and incremental moves (Hambrick et al., 1996). For 
instance, in 2004 when Apple introduced flat panel monitors on its line of computers the then 
CEO Steve Jobs declared it as the “largest high-resolution computer display ever”, admittedly 
taking aim at its competitors and characterizing this move as daring and as unbeatable as could 
be (New York Times, 2004). Additionally, this type of actions is the source of extensive learning 
opportunities for the firm because it exposes the firm to a larger set of competitors and their 
varied competitive behaviors (Ndofor et al., 2011) and to larger domains of competition namely 
new regions and new lines of product and service (Hambrick et al., 1996). 
Competitive dynamics literature explains how awareness, motivation, and capabilities are 
determinants of competitive behavior (Chen and Miller, 1994; Smith et al., 1991, 2001; Chen et 
al., 2007). In previous studies (see, for example, Smith et al., 2001 and Chen et al., 2007), 
awareness is defined as the firm’s capability to acquire new information, decipher market cues, 
and perceive opportunities that arise from its exposure to this new information (He et al., 2009). 
Markets are information networks and the exposure to information enables the detection of new 
opportunities (Penrose, 1959; Andrevski et al., 2016). Researchers found that firms in the same 
business market have equal access to information and that they acquire their distinctive 
capabilities mainly from their ability to internally process and analyze that information 
(Hambrick, 1981). If a firm is exposed to a larger competitive domain, it is likely that the number 
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of information sources available to the firm increases and research suggests that firms have 
mechanisms to manage increased information levels (Thomas et al., 1993). Therefore, as the 
firm operates in larger competitive settings and interacts with a greater number of competitors 
and customers, it also acquires more skills to understand its competitors’ motivations and 
behaviors (Chen et al., 1992; Tsai et al., 2011), their resource prioritization, and their resource 
deployment (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, and Kanfer, 1995). The exposure to a larger 
competitive domain facilitates the discovery of opportunities to expand and the benefits to gain 
from exploring such opportunities are likely to motivate future strategic behavior. The mergers 
and acquisitions literature links early action in merger and acquisition waves to firms’ awareness 
of opportunities and willingness to develop such opportunities (Haleblian et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, learning perspectives emphasize that the exposure to diverse markets with different 
types of customers and competitors impacts managerial cognition and generates more awareness 
of different alternatives to cater and to serve customers (Levitt and March, 1988; Miller and 
Chen, 1994). Overall, firms that undertake competitive actions with wide scope set themselves 
apart as bold innovative players while firms that adopt actions with narrow scope, in smaller 
market domains, and affecting but a few competitors are predictably limiting their competitive 
experience and knowledge (Hambrick et al., 1996).  
Exposure to the competitive environment through actions that reach new and increasingly large 
competitive domains, such as regions, business markets, and product and service lines, will result 
in the acquisition of valuable experience and knowledge for the firm. By learning how the 
market works, the firm is experimenting and developing resources (Chang, 1996) such as 
experience and knowledge that will influence its future choices.  Research in management claims 
that diversification strategies are associated with the efficient use of the firm’s resources through 
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synergies and cost efficiency (Mackey, Barney, and Dotson, 2017) and that the firm’s experience 
and knowledge base of its industry determines its capability of assessing diversification 
opportunities (Chang, 1996). Studies that modeled diversification as part of search processes that 
match the firm’s organizational capabilities to industries (Matsusaka, 2001) concluded that 
diversification is a value creating strategy (Gomes and Livdan, 2004). The competitive dynamics 
literature suggests that firms that have similar resource profiles are more likely to be 
competitively interdependent by sharing the competitive environment and vying for the same 
resources (Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007; Porac and Thomas, 1990). Also, firms are likely to acquire 
competitors, suppliers, or firms in related markets when seeking market power (Hitt, Ireland, and 
Harrison, 2001; Iyer and Miller, 2008). Therefore, I predict that actions that offer a large 
exposure to the competitive environment may lead to strategies of related diversification because 
through them the firm acquires a specific knowledge of the commonalities it shares with its 
competitors and thorough understanding of the opportunities available for expansion in areas that 
are within its knowledge base and offer synergies. Both competitor information and opportunity 
awareness are conditions that bolster the firm’s growth needs and motivate mergers and 
acquisitions of related businesses.  
In competitive settings there is a possibility that firms might lose their resources and capabilities 
to rivals in which case firms need to build strong resource-capability bases to mitigate the risk of 
these losses. Given that firms “learn by doing” (Argote, 1999; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; 
Pisano, 1994; Derfus et al., 2008) and then apply that learning to future actions (Derfus et al., 
2008), it is likely that the stock of experience and knowledge derived from environmental 
exposure to a wider number of competitors is acquired through exploitative learning, which is 
based on the firm’s existing capabilities (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Danneels, 
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2008). Levinthal (2017) argues that prior exploitative investments and learning determine the 
firm’s set of capabilities and its awareness to business opportunities. Therefore, broad scope 
competitive actions can create awareness of competitive opportunities in related businesses and 
motivate strategies of related diversification aimed to acquire similar resources and capabilities 
that protect against future competitive attacks and retaliation. This suggestion follows the slack 
argument according to which excess resources may be used in exploitation strategies that do not 
require the acquisition of additional knowledge but instead use and refine existing competencies 
(March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Danneels, 2008; Chang, 1996). 
Authors argue that firms seek acquisitions that create economies of scale and scope (Bailey and 
Friedlaender, 2001; Iyer and Miller, 2008). Research in strategic management has consistently 
reported that relatedness in firms’ portfolios of business allows resource transfers that create 
efficient and profitable synergies within the firm (Weiss, 2016). Additionally, and confirming 
previous research that found that entry into new markets is primarily shaped by the firms’ 
redeployment of existing capabilities (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Klepper and Simmons, 
2000; Mitchell, 1989; Kapoor and Furr, 2015), recent empirical findings show that when entering 
new businesses diversifying firms may be seeking to leverage their current set of assets (Kapoor 
and Furr, 2015). It is reasonable then to predict that actions with broad competitive scope can 
motivate the strategic acquisition of assets that will create synergies within the firm.   
In sum, I hypothesize that actions with broad scope create awareness of opportunities in the 
market and commonalities among competitors that encourage growth strategies such as 
diversification. This type of actions is also likely to motivate the firm to undertake related 
diversification strategies, which reinforce market power, create cost efficiency and synergies, 
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and constitute insurance against future competitive attacks. The stock of experience and 
knowledge acquired through broad scope competitive actions is assimilated through exploitative 
learning and will lead to the adoption of diversification strategies, and to related diversification. 
Hypothesis 1: Action scope is positively associated with diversification. 
Hypothesis 1a: Action scope is positively associated with related diversification. 
By enabling “learning by acting” competitive actions generate a stock of experience and 
knowledge for the firm and are the source of innovative behavior. Firms derive their purpose 
from a logic of cost efficiency but they also offer “a context of discourse and learning that 
promotes innovation and motivated behavior” (Kogut and Zander, 1996: 511). Although their 
degree of innovativeness may vary, competitive actions are initiated or created by the firm 
without being prompted by rivals’ behavior (MacMillan, 1982; Hambrick et al., 1996) so that 
they are results of the firm’s innate capacity to innovate. Actions of broad scope in particular 
might be particularly conducive to innovative decisions and strategies. The exposure to wider 
domains of competition is likely to fuel the firm’s innovative behavior because it increases the 
number of market interactions and consequent experience to the firm. Previous studies found that 
experience leads to creativity because it builds awareness to alternative choices and to potential 
new reconfigurations of knowledge (Amabile, 1997; Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe, 2007; 
Shane, 2000; Argote and Myron-Spektor, 2011). Consistent behavior generates experience that is 
unambiguous and has a stronger impact on learning processes that lead to knowledge creation 
(Argote and Myron-Spektor, 2011). Learning processes leading to innovation are explorative in 
nature and they encourage expansion to new markets and domains (Danneels, 2008).  Choice that 
is rooted in exploration is overlooked by narrow problemistic search and relates to search for 
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“innovations that would not be approved in face of scarcity but have strong subunit support” 
(Cyert and March, 1963: 279). Research has highlighted how firms are able to explore 
opportunities and enter new markets based on their extant experience and knowledge (Levinthal, 
2017). Although in strategic management initial resource endowments are accepted as main 
determinants of innovation, there has been research on the effects of experience on innovation 
(Cattani, 2005; Klepper, 2002). This research finds that firms that acquire experience and 
knowledge in a particular market or industry might do so without a specific anticipation of the 
future use of these resources but are in a better position to explore new technological domains 
(Cattani, 2005). This insight is useful to explain how competitive actions with broad scope allow 
the acquisition of experience and knowledge that is valuable in the future to enter unrelated 
domains of business. An example of how competitive actions may be determinants of new 
market entry is Amazon. When it started as a book web merchant in 1995, Amazon sold in all 50 
states and 45 other countries during its first month of activity. At the time its CEO declared, 
"Within the first few days, I knew this was going to be huge, it was obvious that we were onto 
something much bigger than we ever dared to hope" (Quittner, 1999).  
In competitive dynamics, awareness is equated with attentiveness to market processes and 
signals (Chen, 1996; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; Lamberg et al., 2009). Managers are expected 
to systematically scan and evaluate the environment in order to identify issues that affect their 
firms’ functioning (Jackson and Dutton, 1988; Dutton and Jackson, 1987). Since actions with 
broad scope reach and affect a large number of market participants, they are a means through 
which the firm acquires a deep awareness of market opportunities and threats. In the previous 
section, I suggested that exploitative learning mechanisms explain the adoption of growth 
strategies based on experience and knowledge that is related to current capabilities and resource 
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base. The exposure to larger domains is also likely to increase attention to market signals and 
develop creativity that derives from experience and knowledge of how the market works (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Lamberg et al., 2009). A higher awareness level and creativity emerging from 
experience will likely motivate the firm to look beyond its current boundaries for new and more 
promising opportunities to grow. The perception of new opportunities is associated with the 
increase of alternatives for action (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; Thomas et al., 1993) and 
with projections of positive outcomes (Jackson and Dutton, 1988; Thomas et al., 1993). 
Although research in diversification found that strategies of related diversification usually 
outperform unrelated diversification in terms of value creation (Mackey et al., 2017; Rumelt, 
1977; Weiss, 2016), recent studies were able to determine that strategies of unrelated 
diversification are value creating for the firm when they involve a high level of managerial 
capabilities and are undertaken under the right conditions (Mackey et al., 2017). Empirical 
studies in finance found that unrelated diversification strategies are means to the exploration of 
new productive opportunities that increase the value of the firm (Mackey et al., 2017; Gomes 
and Livdan, 2004).  Additionally, the stock of experience and knowledge acquired through 
innovative broad scope actions is likely to determine search into new domains and result in a set 
of alternatives that are relevant in terms of strategic choice. In fact, some authors argue that 
search without exploration might be detrimental to the firm’s innovation processes and 
performance results (Cattani, 2005). Therefore, experience and knowledge might determine 
extensive search, that implies entry into unrelated businesses or markets (Levinthal and March, 
1981; Chang, 1996), and lead to new strategic paths such as the adoption of new products, 
technologies, and services in unrelated areas of business. 
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Firms that adopt broad scope competitive actions have been considered bold and creative 
(Hambrick et al., 1996), which may indicate a propensity to explore new ways of cater for their 
customers, enlarge their customer base, and get ahead of competitors. I hypothesize then that 
competitive actions with broad scope, by increasing exposure to the market and its participants, 
influence the firm’s acquisition of a stock of experience and knowledge that will impact the 
firm’s ability to act innovatively.  Experience and knowledge foster the discovery of new market 
opportunities and creativity and competitive boldness motivate the exploration of new 
opportunities through strategies of unrelated diversification. 
Hypothesis 2: Action scope is positively associated with unrelated diversification. 
There is scarce investigation on how competitive actions may lead to the sale of under-
performing assets through divestitures. The same mechanisms that explain how actions with 
broad scope can lead to diversification strategies may also explicate how that type of competitive 
move can result in divestitures. Although traditionally diversification and divestments have been 
studied separately and under different theoretical assumptions, they can also be viewed as 
consequences of a larger issue, that of the scope of the firm (Chang, 1996). Such approach, 
relying on evolutionary arguments, explains that performance gaps may lead to both 
diversification and divestiture decisions and how the firm’s knowledge base may determine both 
entry and exit decisions (Chang, 1996). In a study adopting a fine-grained analysis of divestitures 
in a specific industry, researchers were able to find that partial divestitures are associated with 
growth and with retention of foundational knowledge (Dutt and Vidal, 2016). I argue in this 
dissertation that learning acquired through competitive actions enables strategic alternatives that 
may either result in diversification or divestment. In previous sections, I suggested that by 
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affording an exposure to the competitive environment that creates a stock of experience and 
knowledge in the firm, broad scope actions are crucial in the detection of new strategic 
opportunities of growth through related and unrelated diversification. Such experience and 
knowledge may also signal that given the circumstances the best strategic choice is the 
divestiture of assets. For example, in 2012 Microsoft decided to divest its Zune music platform 
abandoning indefinitely the portable media player market and allowing rival Apple to take over 
its market share (Chen and Jorgensen, 2016).  
Firm experience associated with learning results in organizational actions and outcomes (Bergh 
and Lim, 2008). The same learning process that may uncover an opportunity to grow through 
diversification may expose an opportunity to divest. Previous research found that firms divest as 
part of search and selection processes (Chang, 1996), as a way to improve efficiency in resource 
allocation within the firm, and to redirect focus to core businesses (Mackey et al., 2017; Bergh 
and Lim, 2008). Empirical findings show that previous relevant experience and knowledge 
impact the financial success of divestitures (Bergh and Lim, 2008). Therefore, it might be 
expected that experience and knowledge acquired through competitive actions, particularly ones 
that are pervasive, may in particular circumstances direct the firm to the divestment of assets.  
Duhaime and Grant (1984) suggest that divestitures can be profitable strategic choices when 
firms do not want to face the eventual decline of less profitable business units. Their empirical 
findings show that large diversified firms divest units that are less profitable and less dependent 
of other units (Duhaime and Grant, 1984). I anticipate that firms might be able to detect an 
“opportunity to divest” through market interactions and realize that some activities are not worth 
pursuing and should be abandoned. The stock of experience and knowledge on which the firm 
relies for strategic choice offers leeway for the adoption of growth strategies but can also lead to 
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resource release strategies when the assessment of the competitive environment determines that 
divesting particular assets may constitute a better option. Recent empirical research found that in 
cases of underperformance, a divestment strategy is pursued if firms have slack resources 
(Kuusela et al., 2016). This research aligns with previous theorizing that slack resources impact 
organizational action and increase strategic options. It also reinforces the argument that by 
adopting competitive actions with broad scope the firm obtains a stock of experience and 
knowledge of its competitive environment that determines its strategic choice and may determine 
asset divestments. 
Hypothesis 3: Action scope is positively associated with divestitures. 
Scholars in competitive dynamics argue that is important to understand competition through a 
perspective that embraces corporate social responsibility issues and stakeholders’ participation 
(Chen and Miller, 2012; 2015). Theoretical arguments for the reconceptualization of the 
competitive dynamics paradigm propose the inclusion of forms of competition that rely more on 
cooperation than retaliation and increase the attention given to stakeholders’ needs and concerns 
(Chen and Miller, 2015). So far advances in this area have been scarce (Chen and Miller, 2015). 
In this dissertation it is suggested that competitive actions can be determinants of choices that 
express the firm’s involvement in social and environmental issues. To explain how, it is 
important to acknowledge that firms are increasingly more dependent on their stakeholders 
(Kotter, 2005) and that these stakeholders are increasingly more critical of economic and 
business activities that may have negative impact on society and environment (Padmar et al., 
2010).   
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Competitive actions expose the firm to the market and its participants and actions with broad 
scope in particular are more likely to create awareness of opportunities and threats and motivate 
the pursuit of new strategic directions. Competitive actions can be sources of responsible firm 
behavior towards society and environment. Competitors and consumers evaluate firm’s behavior 
by observing its competitive actions and therefore these can be an effective means to 
communicate the firm’s environmental, philanthropic, and social profile. 
A cornerstone of the present research is how exposure to broader competitive domains creates 
experience and knowledge that trigger awareness to new opportunities and motivation to adopt 
them. In management literature it is suggested that a firm that has extensive interaction with its 
stakeholders may be presented with a larger and better set of opportunities from which to choose 
(Harrison, Bosse, and Phillips, 2010). The adoption of a stakeholder perspective holds promise 
for the firm in terms of new opportunities that may be exposed from interaction with customers 
and in certain cases, competitors (Chen and Miller, 2015; Porter, 1998). The pursuit of CSR 
initiatives that were discovered by the exposure to larger sets of stakeholders will then likely 
translate into a competitive advantage for the firm.  
Corporate social responsibility is characterized as an innovative strategy (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008) because it implies investments in newer and more 
updated technologies and on systems and processes that reflect the concern for social and 
environmental issues (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). In the area of ecological sensitivity, for 
example, firms may find economic opportunities by adopting new activities and processes that 
are ecologically more benign. These include energy and waste management processes, more 
efficient input-output ratio of production, ecological labeling and marketing practices, and the 
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development of environmental-friendly products (Bansal and Roth, 2000). Research aiming to 
establish the determinants of corporate ecological sensitivity found that competitiveness and the 
pursuit of competitive advantage were motivations for ecological behavior and that in some 
industries firms were able to find strategic niches and to present themselves as the “green 
alternative” (Bansal and Roth, 2000). It is likely therefore, that the experience and knowledge 
acquired through broad scope competitive actions creates awareness in the firm of new areas of 
social and environmental concern, stimulates a creative approach to the management of these 
issues, and leads to competitive advantage. I adopt an argument that is similar to the CSR’s slack 
resources hypothesis (Surroca, Tribó, and Waddock, 2010; Waddock and Graves, 1997) that 
proposes that organizational slack stimulates the adoption of CSR by providing the firm with 
enough financial resources to undertake this strategy (McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 
1988; Surroca et al., 2010). The exposure of the firm to a wider competitive environment, which 
induces more awareness of social and environmental concerns, generates a stock of experience 
and knowledge that may prompt distal and proactive search. This type of search, based on the 
availability of resources, promotes the quest for new solutions, creates a wider set of choices, and 
facilitates innovation in general. Additionally, and following the slack hypothesis’ arguments, 
this excess of experience and knowledge resources may offset some of the risks of undertaking 
uncertain strategies such as CSR. 
Thus, I hypothesize that the stock of experience and knowledge acquired through competitive 
actions of broad scope increases the firm’s awareness of social and environmental concerns and, 
given the salience of this experience in managers’ mind and the effects of availability bias, will 
lead to the selection of innovative strategies such as CSR. 
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Hypothesis 4: Action scope is positively associated with corporate social responsibility. 
Action repertoire 
Competitive actions are usually carried out through sequences of aggregated moves that express 
the firm’s willingness to acquire competitive advantage by deploying efficient competitive 
attacks (Ferrier et al., 1999; Young et al., 1996; Ferrier, 2001). The set of competitive actions 
used by the firm, or its competitive repertoire (Ferrier, 2001; Miller and Chen, 2012), indicates 
how the firm competes, which can be either through the adoption of varied and complex actions 
or the concentration on a few specific and simpler moves (Miller and Chen, 1996; Ferrier and 
Lyon, 2004). Research linked financial performance to the firm’s choice of repertoire; repertoire 
simplicity, or the firm’s concentration on a few simple actions, was associated with poor 
financial results, particularly in dynamic environments (Miller and Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 
1999; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Rindova et al., 2010; Larrañeta, Zahra, and Gonzalez, 2014) while 
complexity and variety in competitive behavior was determinant of financial success (Ferrier, 
2001; Ndofor et al., 2011).  
 Diverse repertoires require that the firm apply considerable effort into learning and therefore 
improve the firm’s learning capacities (Larrañeta et al., 2014). Learning acquired through 
diverse repertoires is essential to the reconfiguration of resources, the development of flexibility, 
and consequently, a suitable adaptation to market changes and can therefore be used in future 
strategic actions (Miller and Chen, 1994). The way the firm assembles its set of competitive 
actions signals its ability to creatively deploy resources and capabilities (Ferrier et al., 1999). 
Through diverse repertoires the firm engages in valuable internal learning experiences from 
interaction with its customers, competitors, and markets (Larrañeta et al., 2014). Also, diverse 
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repertoires allow an exposure to more aspects of customers and competitors’ activities 
(Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; Miller and Chen, 1996). Diverse repertoires are difficult to 
imitate and through them the firm is able to explore at length privileged relationships with its 
customers, further increasing the number and type of actions the firm is then able to undertake 
and creating a familiarity with the market that translates into experience and knowledge.  
Increased market exposure and consequent development of learning processes through diverse 
repertoires build experience and knowledge of competitive environment that alert managers to 
opportunities and impact the firm’s set of strategic choices. In one hand, diverse repertoires are 
bound to activate internal learning, which is based on and refines existing capabilities. On the 
other, these repertoires are more resource consuming since they require prompt availability of 
resources to support multiple competitive actions (Larrañeta, et al., 2014), new configurations, 
and effective attacks that create obstacles to appropriate and timely responses from competitors 
(Ferrier and Lyon, 2004). Accordingly, given the boosting on internal learning and the need to 
replenish depleted resources, related diversification strategies are plausible and adequate choices 
when the firm needs to build on similar capacities and resources to grow.  Additionally, market 
exposure through a variety of actions facilitates the detection of other firms with similar 
resources and capabilities. Thus, I predict that diverse repertoires of action provide the firm with 
a wider set of strategic choices and given that they activate internal learning that refines existing 
capabilities, they are likely to determine exploitation strategies implicit in related diversification.  
Hypothesis 5: Action repertoire is positively associated with diversification. 
Hypothesis 5a: Action repertoire is positively associated with related diversification 
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Exposure to the competitive environment through diverse repertoires creates experience and 
knowledge that determine the set of strategic choices available to managers. Indeed, repertoires 
can be seen as alternatives of choice (March and Simon, 1958). This dissertation contends that 
the stock of resources a firm acquires through exposure to competition leads to strategies of 
growth and innovation based on acquired knowledge and experience. Studies show that 
experience promotes behavior diversity and change in managerial competitive posture (Miller 
and Chen, 1994), while behavior simplicity leads to inertia (Huber, 1991; Miller and Chen, 
1994). Experience is also determinant of proactive learning and explorative behavior that is 
based on information, market diversity, and motivation to seize opportunities (Chen and Miller, 
1994; March, 1991).  
Diverse repertoires generate more market feedback (Miller and Chen, 1996a) thereby creating 
more alertness to opportunities (Miller and Chen, 1994; Ndofor et al., 2011); however, these 
opportunities may come in the form of divestitures instead of growth strategies. Through the 
interaction with competitors and customers that diverse repertoires generate (Miller and Chen, 
1996a; Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991), it is possible that the firm realizes that in some areas 
of its business it cannot compete at reasonable level with its competitors or offer the products or 
services desired by its clients. Additionally, these repertoires are resource-intensive (Larrañeta et 
al., 2014), and may lead to resource depletion, which can require the divestment of assets. 
Studies found that firms simplify their repertoires when they attain good performance levels 
because financial performance affects search incentives and creates complacency in managers 
(March, 1988; Miller, 1994; Lant, Milliken, and Batra, 1992; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; 
Weick, 1987; Miller and Chen, 1996a). Some authors emphasize that there are benefits in 
focusing on specific businesses and allocate resources and effort to specific activities (Miller and 
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Chen, 1996a). Therefore, the same reasoning that I used to argue that diverse repertoires may 
lead to growth strategies can justify divestitures in particular circumstances. 
Hypothesis 6: Action repertoire is positively associated with divestitures. 
Diverse repertoires of actions expose the firm to the competitive environment, raise awareness of 
new opportunities, and develop flexibility and knowledge to creatively adapt to new competitive 
coordinates. Thus, a firm adopting this type of repertoires may be particularly apt to adopt CSR 
initiatives. Given that CSR motivates search of new ways of competing through strategies of 
differentiation (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000, 2001; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008) and investment 
in activities that are more responsible towards society and environment, a firm that acquires 
experience and knowledge based on diverse action repertoires is likely to be more skilled at 
evaluating new ways to manage social and environmental concerns. The exposure to markets, its 
participants, and new trends in customer demand are conditions for the creation of awareness of 
social and environmental problems. Literature in CSR consistently points to the need of equating 
stakeholders’ expectations in the adoption of CSR initiatives (McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 
2006). From a competition point of view, the exposure to markets and increasing numbers of 
consumers and competitors may place the firm in an advantageous point to deliver socially 
responsible actions, either through the creation of new products and services, the redesign of the 
existing ones, the reconfiguration of resources and capabilities, and the improvement of 
packaging and distribution systems (Surroca et al., 2010), or through the adoption of 
philanthropic actions addressed at particular stakeholders.  
The stock of experience and knowledge acquired through diverse repertoires may also function 
as a buffer that helps the firm to deal with the uncertainty of adopting CSR policies. Given that 
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experience is linked to creativity (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011) and that CSR initiatives may 
be seen as an innovative way to pursue competitive advantage and growth (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008), I suggest that the stock of experience and knowledge 
that the firm acquires by undertaking diverse repertoires influences strategic choice and may lead 
to the adoption of CSR. 
Hypothesis 7: Action repertoire is positively associated with corporate social responsibility. 
The moderating effect of organizational slack 
Awareness and motivation are important explanations of competitive behavior. However, the 
firm also needs to match the opportunities in the competitive environment with its own 
capabilities, particularly when adopting and implementing competitive actions (Chen et al., 
2007; Miller and Chen, 2012). The availability of slack resources reinforces the firm’s 
capabilities (Lamberg et al., 2009) and facilitates the adoption of actions with broad scope and 
the use of diverse repertoires of action. The presence of organizational slack is bound to affect 
the way the firm deploys its resources and develops its capabilities toward particular strategic 
decisions. Slack resources increase the firm’s ability to identify new opportunities (Danneels, 
2008; Salge and Vera, 2013) and allow investment in new talent, ideas, and technologies that 
lead to higher innovation rates and more flexibility to adapt to new market conditions (Lamberg 
et al., 2009). Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) found that early exposure to markets consolidates 
firms’ experience and knowledge and speeds up product and service innovation. Additionally, 
innovative behavior triggers technological change and is associated with performance (Lee et al., 
2000; Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009). In the CSR area, new process innovation is a vehicle 
for the implementation of responsible practices (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Christmann, 
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2000; Surroca et al., 2010) and CSR initiatives can be sources of innovation by engaging firms’ 
in more responsible ways of doing business.  
This dissertation suggests that competitive actions have an important role in enabling the firm’s 
acquisition of a stock of experience and knowledge that is likely to narrow strategic selection. 
This stock of resources influences the processes through which a firm becomes aware of its 
competitive environment and motivated to take advantage of opportunities to grow or to engage 
in socially responsible strategies. Here, I predict that organizational slack will reinforce a firm’s 
ability to fully take advantage of its innovative competitive actions. Slack resources are 
necessary for the exploration of new market and technological domains (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 
1986; Danneels, 2008) and they are the basis for firm growth as they offer the necessary resource 
cushion that allows the unconstrained pursuit of new strategic directions (Sharfman et al., 1988; 
Bourgeois, 1981; Danneels, 2008).  
It is likely therefore that the presence of slack resources will strengthen the relationship between 
broad scope competitive actions and diverse repertoires of action and diversification, as slack 
resources will facilitate the adoption of growth strategies. I also hypothesize that slack resources 
are likely to strengthen the pursuit of innovative strategies such as CSR that may be the result of 
search processes prompted by actions of broad scope and diverse repertoires of action.  
Hypothesis 8: Organizational slack moderates the relationship between (a) action scope and 
diversification, (b) action scope and corporate social responsibility, such that organizational 
slack strengthens these relationships. 
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Hypothesis 9: Organizational slack moderates the relationship between (a) action repertoires and 
diversification, (b) action repertoires and corporate social responsibility, such that organizational 







Data and Sample 
Annual financial and corporate data is collected from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT 
industrial databases for North America. Data on mergers and acquisitions is collected from 
COMPUSTAT’s Segments database available in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
Divestitures are collected from SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisition Database provided by 
Thomson Financial. Corporate social responsibility data is collected from the MSCI ESG 
database, usually called KLD. The starting population for this research project consists of all 
S&P 500 US-based firms for the years between 2009 and 2015. The choice of this temporal span 
follows previous research suggestions that periods of environmental stability are more adequate 
to assess competitive activity (Nadkarni et al., 2016); during the period of time between the 
beginning of 2009 and the end of 2015 the competitive environment did not suffer from 
environmental jolts and in 2009 the economy was in steady recovery from the downturn that 
started on December 2007 (Temin, 2010). The sampling method for this study is based on prior 
research in competitive dynamics and the starting sample includes all firms in the S&P 500 index 
with the exclusion of firms in the financial and insurance industries, as well as business service 
industries, because their competitive moves cannot be observed through public records and are
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therefore not easily detectable (Ferrier, 2001; Derfus et al., 2008; Nadkarni et al., 2016). From 
those firms I select 250 as my final sample. 
Competitive actions are specific and observable therefore likely to be reported in the business 
news (Derfus et al., 2008; Miller and Chen, 1994). Data on competitive actions and their features 
is collected from the Ravenpack News Analytics Database which contains press releases and 
news articles collected from the Dow Jones Financial Wires, the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, 
and Marketwatch since January 2000. 
Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
Firm performance. I include a firm performance measure. Return on assets (ROA), an 
accounting measure that is widely used in strategy studies to measure operational performance is 
calculated as net income divided by total assets (Schmalensee, 1985; Finkelstein and Boyd, 
1998; Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, and Hill, 2015). Given that my hypotheses reflect the deployment 
of resources and managerial decisions, this measure of operational performance will capture the 
expected effects of diversification and corporate philanthropy on the firm’s operations and 
returns (Petrenko et al., 2015). 
Diversification. The outcomes of this study are diversification actions taken by firms following 
tactical competitive actions. Diversification actions are long-term strategic actions that involve 
substantial commitment from firms and deploy significant resources. Examples are, among 
others, mergers and acquisitions (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Divestitures are also included as an 
outcome because these actions divest important resources of a firm and are therefore important 
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strategic decisions. Diversification is measured with the entropy index that is commonly used in 
the diversification literature (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985; Robins and Wiersema, 
2003). The total diversification index is: 
          N 
DT = Σ Pi ln (1/Pi) 
         i=1 
where Pi = proportion of  business activity (sales) in SIC code i for a firm with N different 4-digit 
SIC businesses. The unrelated entropy index, DU, is measured in the same manner using 2-digit 
SIC codes: 
          N 
DU = Σ Pi ln (1/Pi) 
         i=1 
 
where Pi = proportion of business activity (sales) in SIC code i for a firm with N different 2-digit 
SIC businesses. The related entropy index (DR) is calculated as the difference between total and 
unrelated diversification, as DT – DU = DR (Robins and Wiersema, 2003). 
Corporate social responsibility. CSR will be measured as an aggregate net score of various 
dimensions, as commonly used in studies in this area (Petrenko et al., 2015; Choi and Wang, 
2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). 
Divestitures. Divestitures were used in previous strategy studies as a turnaround strategy that 
constitutes a response to external factors (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008) or a measure of strategic 
change (Sanders, 2001; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). I create a divestiture measure by 
regressing several predictors, net income, leverage, current ratio, and entropy, on a dummy 
divestiture propensity variable. I then use the predicted value as my divestitures measure. 
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       ^ 
(DIVEST)= β0 + β1NETINCOME + β2LEVERAGE + β3CURRENTRATIO + β4 ENTROPY + u 
Independent Variables 
Action scope. Action scope is defined as “the competitive magnitude or relative scale and 
significance of the firm’s actions” (Hambrick et al., 1996: 664); “a firm’s actions can be 
considered in terms of their scope, or the extent of the firm’s operations that are affected by the 
moves (Chen and MacMillan, 1992). Initiatives taken only in one product line or one region are 
relatively narrow in scope, while others affect the company’s full range of operations, all of its 
products and markets (Porter, 1980)” (Hambrick et al., 1996: 666). 
To operationalize scope, I created a composite measure aggregating the five types of major 
tactical competitive actions: new pricing actions, new product actions, new capacity actions, new 
marketing actions, and new market expansion actions, following previous studies in competitive 
dynamics (for example, Connelly et al., 2017). These categories were organized yearly by 
company and reflect not only the number of competitive actions undertook by the company in 
one year but also the novelty of such actions. 
Action repertoire. Competitive repertoire simplicity may be manifested in certain aspects of 
competitive repertoires: range, concentration, and dominance. In this study I use range as the 
measure of diverse repertoire. Range is the total number of types of market-oriented actions 
taken by the firm within a certain period of time. For example, a small repertoire has a small 
range of actions. The competitive repertoire of a firm expresses the total number of unique 
actions taken by a firm each year (Miller and Chen, 1996). To construct this measure, I use the 
index build in previous competitive dynamics studies (Miller and Chen, 1996). This index take 
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the number of actions in each of the j (=1,…,5) categories for each of the i (=1, …, 250) 
companies in the year t (=2009,…, 2015): χi,j,t.  
Action repertoire range is measured with:  
 R or range index count measures the number of types of actions, Ri,t = count (Ai,j,t); 
               j 
The smaller the range, the simpler the repertoire is. Inversely, the more diverse a repertoire the 
larger the range (Miller and Chen, 1996; Larrañeta et al., 2014). For this measure, I collected the 
same categories of competitive actions that I used for the scope measure. 
Slack. Slack is measured with absorbed or recoverable slack (Bourgeois, 1981; Ferrier and Lyon, 
2004; Iyer and Miller, 2008; Nadkarni et al., 2016). Absorbed slack are the excess of resources 
that were absorbed into the cost structure but can be recovered when needed (Singh, 1986; 
Haleblian et al., 2012). This measure is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that the 
relationship between action scope and repertoire and diversification strategies and CSR may be 
reinforced by the availability of slack resources. 
Control variables 
Firm level variables. Included are controls that have influence on the adoption of competitive 
actions. At firm level, I control for firm size, measured as the logarithm of total employees 
(Larrañeta et al., 2014; Nadkarni et al., 2015). I introduced this control because competitive 
activity, in particular the adoption of competitive actions, is influenced by the size of the firm 
(Connelly et al., 2010; Ndofor et al., 2011;). Additionally, firm size affects the type of 
repertoires that the firm undertakes (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and Chen, 1996; Chen and 
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Hambrick, 1995). I control for firm age (Miller and Chen, 1996a, 1996b), for prior performance 
(Ferrier, 2001; Andrevski et al., 2016), and for firm leverage (debt/equity) as a measure of firm’s 
financial flexibility as these variables have impact on competitive behavior at firm level 
according to previous research. Organizational slack was accounted for because availability of 
resources can influence the adoption of competitive actions (Ndofor et al., 2011; Petrenko et al., 
2015). Controls for R&D intensity (R&D spending/total sales), capital intensity (fixed 
assets/total book assets), and advertising intensity (advertising spending/total sales) were 
included to capture firm’s innovation and marketing investments (Iyer and Miller, 2008; 
Andrevski et al., 2016). 
Industry level variables. In the analysis, industry-level controls are included, following previous 
empirical studies in competitive dynamics. Industry concentration, measured with the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) of industry concentration calculated for each two-digit SIC 
code for each year (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Larrañeta et al., 2014; 
Nadkarni et al., 2016), is controlled for as concentration creates entry barriers and may have 
impact on competition within the industry (Ferrier, 2001; Nadkarni et al., 2016). Given that the 
analysis concerns the adoption of diversification strategies, I control for average levels of 
diversification in the industry as these can influence firms’ decisions. I include year and industry 
dummies to control for time and systematic differences in industries (Haleblian et al., 2012; 
Kuusela et al., 2016). I also control for industry CSR levels, as some industries are likely to be 






Data is set up as a dynamic panel containing lagged dependent variables and estimated with the 
first difference Arellano and Bond estimator which uses the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Greene, 2008). The Arellano and 
Bond estimator is adequate for data that has a small number of time periods with the likelihood 
of endogeneity between the independent and dependent variables, many individual cross-
sectional units, and a dynamic independent variable (Roodman, 2009; Alessandri and Seth, 
2014) and addresses concerns such as fixed effects and the potential endogeneity of regressors 
(Roodman, 2009). The GMM estimator is robust to potential autocorrelation and 
heteroskedascity (Roodman, 2009). My instrumentation strategy follows the Arellano and Bond 
approach and I use lagged values of the endogenous regressors as instruments (Roodman, 2009; 
Alessandri and Seth, 2014). The consistency of this strategy depends on the validity of the 
instruments and on the assumption that the error term does not carry serial correlation (Beck, 
Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004). For all the models in my dissertation, I 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to assume that there is no serial correlation in the error terms (Alessandri and 
Seth, 2014; Roodman, 2009). 
Following previous research, I test for the validity of my instruments using the Hansen and the 
difference-in-Hansen statistics (for example, Alessandri and Seth, 2014). The null hypothesis in 
these statistics is that the specified regressors are appropriate instruments. In my tests, I failed to 
reject the null hypothesis and therefore I conclude that my regressors are appropriate 
instruments.   
 
 63
The models are as following: 
General model: 
Yi, t = β0 + β1 Yi,t-1 + β2 Xi,t-1 + β3 Z*i,t-1 + β4 Z**i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + eit 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔYi,t = β1ΔYi,t-2 + β2 Δ Xi,t-2 + β3 Δ Z*i,t-2 + β4 Z**i,t-2+ ui,t 
 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
where 
Y = dependent variable 
X = independent variable 
Z* = industry control variables 
Z** = firm control variables 
u = error term (ν – industry specific effect, γ – year specific effect, e – observation specific 
effect) 
Model 1 
DIVi,t = β0 + β1 DIVi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** [FCONTROLS]i,t + 
β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔDIVi,t = β1ΔDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ [FCONTROLS]i,t-2 
+ β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 





RDIVi,t = β0 + β1 RDIVi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** [FCONTROLS]i,t + 
β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔRDIVi,t = β1ΔRDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 1b 
UDIVi,t = β0 + β1 UDIVi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** [FCONTROLS]i,t + 
β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔUDIVi,t = β1ΔUDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 1c 
DIVESTi,t = β0 + β1 DIVESTi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔDIVESTi,t = β1ΔDIVESTi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
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Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 1d 
CSRi,t = β0 + β1 CSRi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** [FCONTROLS]i,t + 
β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔCSRi,t = β1ΔCSRi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ [FCONTROLS]i,t-2 
+ β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 1e (interaction model) 
DIVi,t = β0 + β1 DIVi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** [FCONTROLS]i,t + 
β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t + β6 (DIVi,t x SLACKi,t) + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔDIVi,t = β1ΔDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ [FCONTROLS]i,t-2 
+ β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2+ β6 Δ (DIVi,t-2 x SLACKi,t-2) +  ui,t 
 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
Model 1f (interaction model) 
CSRi,t = β0 + β1 CSRi,t-1 + β2 SCOPEi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** [FCONTROLS]i,t + 
β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t + β6 (SCOPEi,t x SLACKi,t) + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 




ΔCSRi,t = β1ΔCSRi,t-2 + β2 ΔSCOPEi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ [FCONTROLS]i,t-2 
+ β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2+ β6 Δ (SCOPEi,t-2 x SLACKi,t-2) +  ui,t 
 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
Model 2 
DIVi,t = β0 + β1 DIVi,t-1 + β2 REPERTOIREi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔDIVi,t = β1ΔDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔREPERTOIREi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 2a 
RDIVi,t = β0 + β1 RDIVi,t-1 + β2 REPERTOIREi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔRDIVi,t = β1ΔRDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔREPERTOIREi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 2b 
DIVESTi,t = β0 + β1 DIVESTi,t-1 + β2 REPERTOIREi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
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ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔDIVESTi,t = β1ΔDIVESTi,t-2 + β2 ΔREPERTOIREi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 2c 
CSRi,t = β0 + β1 CSRi,t-1 + β2 REPERTOIREi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔCSRi,t = β1ΔCSRi,t-2 + β2 ΔREPERTOIREi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2 + ui,t 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
 
Model 2d (interaction model) 
DIVi,t = β0 + β1 DIVi,t-1 + β2 REPERTOIREi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t + β6 (REPERTOIREi,t x SLACKi,t) + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔDIVi,t = β1ΔDIVi,t-2 + β2 ΔREPERTOIREi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2+ β6 Δ (REPERTOIREi,t-2 x SLACKi,t-2) +  ui,t 
 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
Model 2e (interaction model) 
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CSRi,t = β0 + β1 CSRi,t-1 + β2 REPERTOIREi,t-1 + β3* [INDCONTROLS]i,t-1 + β4** 
[FCONTROLS]i,t + β5** [PRIORPERF]i,t-1 + ui,t + β6 (REPERTOIREi,t x SLACKi,t) + ui,t  
ui,t = νi + γt + ei,t 
Transformation using first-differences 
 
ΔCSRi,t = β1ΔCSRi,t-2 + β2 ΔREPERTOIREi,t-2 + β3* Δ[INDCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β4**Δ 
[FCONTROLS]i,t-2 + β5**Δ [PRIORPERF]i,t-2+ β6 Δ (REPERTOIREi,t-2 x SLACKi,t-2) +  ui,t 
 
Δ ui,t = Δνi + Δ γt + ei,t = Δ ei,t 
where 
DIV – diversification; RDIV – related diversification; UDIV – unrelated diversification 
REPERTOIRE – repertoire of competitive actions 
CSR – corporate social responsibility 
SCOPE – scope of competitive action 
SLACK – absorbed slack 
FIRM CONTROLS – firm size, firm age, prior performance, firm leverage, inventory intensity, 
SGA intensity, R&D intensity, capital intensity, advertising intensity, long term slack, and 
potential slack 
INDUSTRY CONTROLS - industry concentration, , industry average diversification, industry 
average CSR, year and industry dummies 








Table 1 displays the correlation table and descriptive statistics. Tables 2 through 8 display the 
results for the tests of hypotheses, with unstandardized coefficients and the standard errors in 
parentheses. I report the number of observations for each model, the Wald Chi2, the AR(2) test 
statistic, the Hansen test, and the difference-in-Hansen test. I also include, for each model, the 
results of the analysis with controls only. In this chapter I present the results for each hypothesis 
in the dissertation. I find support for hypotheses 1, 1a, 3, 5, and 5a. I also find marginal support 
for hypothesis 7 and partial support for hypothesis 8 and 9. I do not find support for hypotheses 
2, 4, and 6. 
My hypothesis 1 predicted that action scope is positively associated with diversification. This 
prediction is supported. Table 2 displays the results for the GMM dynamic panel estimation of 
the effects of action scope and repertoire on diversification strategies. In Model 1 of this table, 
the results show a positive and significant influence of action scope on diversification (β=0.001; 
p < 0.001).  
I hypothesized that action scope is positively associated related diversification in H1a. Model 1a 
on Table 3 shows that there is support for this hypothesis (β=0.001; p < 0.01). I also
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hypothesized in Hypothesis 2 that action scope would be positively associated with unrelated 
diversification; Model 1b in Table 4 shows that the two variables have a non-significant 
relationship. Therefore, H2 is not supported. I address possible explanations for this non-
significant result in the discussion part of this dissertation. 
In Hypothesis 3, I posited the association between action scope and the firm’s propensity to 
divest. Table 5, Model 1c, shows that this relationship is indeed strong and significant (β=0.004; 
p < 0.001), giving full support to my prediction.  
I hypothesized that action scope would be positively related to CSR in H4. This hypothesis is not 
supported with results of the GMM estimator showing a positive but non-significant association 
(Table 6, Model 1d). I will explore this result in the discussion. 
I found a strong positive and significant relationship between the firm’s repertoire of action and 
its diversification strategy (Hypothesis 5). Table 2 displays in Model 2 that repertoire influences 
positively the adoption of diversification strategies (β=0.03; p < 0.001). I also find support for 
Hypothesis 5a that predicted a positive relationship between repertoire and related diversification 
(β=0.020; p < 0.001). This result is displayed in Table 3, Model 2a. 
I did not find support for Hypothesis 6. Model 2b on Table 5 shows a non-significant 
relationship between the repertoire of a firm and its propensity to divest. However, results shown 
in Model 2c on Table 6 show that the repertoire of actions a firm possesses is marginally 
associated with its adoption of CSR (β=0.347; p < 0.05). Hypothesis 7 is therefore supported. 
Finally, on hypotheses 8 and 9, I predicted that organizational slack would influence the adoption 
of strategies of diversification and CSR by the firm. Table 7 shows that I found partial support 
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for Hypothesis 8 that predicted that organizational slack moderates the relationship between 
action scope and both diversification and CSR. Although model 1e shows a non-significant 
influence of the moderation variable on the relationship between scope and diversification, 
Model 1f shows that the interaction term for CSR is positive and significant (β=0.085; p < 0.01), 
therefore supporting my prediction that organizational slack strengthens the association between 
scope and CSR. 
Finally, I hypothesized that organizational slack moderates the relationship between repertoire 
and both diversification and CSR (H9). This hypothesis is also partially supported. The results 
for the GMM estimator are positive and significant for CSR (β=1.68; p < 0.001) (Table 8, Model 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation develops a theory of action driven strategy. Strategic management and 
competitive dynamics research has explored the connection between competitive actions and 
firm performance by analyzing the effects of actions that firms adopt to create competitive 
advantage and market dominance on their competitors’ behaviors and performance (Miller and 
Chen, 1994; Hambrick et al., 1996). In this study I follow calls from the competitive dynamics 
scholarship to extend the effects of competitive actions into other organizational areas (Rindova 
et al., 2010; Lamberg et al., 2009) and I examine their role as drivers of strategic choice. In my 
set of hypotheses, I propose and test the association between characteristics of competitive 
actions such as scope and the use of repertoires of actions and the adoption of the most important 
organizational strategies namely diversification, divestitures, and CSR. I suggest that competitive 
actions expose the firm to its competitive environment and I anticipate that this exposure creates 
resources such as knowledge and experience that are likely to be salient in managers’ minds and 
narrow the alternatives available for strategic choice. The results of my empirical tests show that 
overall there are significant associations between the scope of competitive actions and the 
repertoires used by the firm and the firm’s choice of strategy and that these associations should 
be considered when theorizing about the effects of competition on strategic behavior. 
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Action Scope and Repertoire and the Adoption of Diversification Strategies  
I theorized that actions with broad scope would be associated with the adoption of diversification 
strategies. My arguments were based on the idea that competitive actions with broad scope are 
likely to reach a larger number of competitors (Chen et al., 1992; Ndofor et al., 2011) and 
expose the firm to new geographic markets, require the use of new technologies, and stimulate 
new lines of products and services (for example, Hambrick et al., 1996). This exposure is then 
likely to create experience and knowledge of the competitive environment and trigger strategic 
choice motivated by the salience of such knowledge and experience in managerial cognition. The 
results of my test of hypothesis show that broad scope competitive actions are related to both 
strategies of organizational diversification and related diversification.  
I also found that, as I posited, diverse repertoires of actions are motivators of organizational 
diversification and related diversification. My arguments sustain the competitive dynamics 
literature findings that indicate that diverse repertoires are source of creativity and improve the 
firm’s learning capacities by providing flexibility and adaptation to market variation (Miller and 
Chen, 1994). I predicted that diverse repertoires would boost internal learning and expose the 
firm to a selection of customers’ and competitors’ activities thereby encouraging firm growth 
and expansion to similar and related areas of business.  
The results of this study do not however show support for the relationship between action scope 
and unrelated diversification. My arguments were largely based on the idea that actions of broad 
scope might be sources of explorative learning. Exploration in organizational learning research 
has been linked to expansion to new markets (Danneels, 2008) and I based my reasoning on the 
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fact that Amazon, for example, started its operations in one single business targeting a large 
number of geographical markets at the same time, a move that preceded its entry into several 
businesses.  I figured broad scope competitive behavior would be likely to generate a richer 
discovery process and determine entry into new and unrelated industries. My test of hypothesis 
does not confirm my reasoning. I found that actions of broad scope do not determine the 
adoption unrelated diversification strategies and are not therefore determinants of entry into 
unrelated businesses. A reason for this lack of association between broad scope actions and 
unrelated diversification might be that these actions do not generate the kind of explorative 
learning that is necessary to enter new business areas. Another possible reason might be that 
firms undertake unrelated diversification for motives other than firm’s growth or market 
dominance. Strategic management studies found that related diversification consistently 
outperforms unrelated diversification because of its ability to leverage economies of scope and 
synergy across multiple businesses (see, for example, Mackey et al., 2017). Recent findings 
reveal that specific conditions need to be in place for unrelated diversification to lead to value 
creation (Mackey et al., 2017). It might be that my suggestion that market exposure is a way to 
promote explorative learning that then leads to the choice of entry into unrelated businesses is 
not the process through which competitive behavior might drive unrelated diversification. 
Action Scope and Repertoire and the Adoption of Divestitures  
I predicted in this dissertation that competitive actions of broad scope and diverse repertoires of 
action would be associated with divestiture strategies. Both hypotheses 3 and 6 address an 
important gap in management literature which is the investigation of the impact of competitive 
actions in divestitures. Generally, when a firm exits a market the competitive environment 
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softens (Chen and Jorgensen, 2016) as this exit encourages rivals to seize the firm’s market 
share. Although studies have examined the conditions and antecedents of restructuring decisions 
and divestment of assets (for example, Bergh and Lim, 2008; Trahms, Ndofor, and Sirmon, 
2013) and authors found the positive results that these strategies may bring to the firm (Dutt and 
Vidal, 2016), less attention has been given to the association between to competitive behavior 
and divestments. Managers and investors observed that the spin-offs undertook after the credit 
crisis of 2008-2009 were not generally adopted for defensive reasons but as a proactive strategic 
choice (Smith and Thomas, 2011). This assessment strengthens my belief that divestitures may 
be the result of managerial choice that is not motivated by external events such crises or 
economic downturns but instead guided by efficiency and good reasoning. In my test of 
hypothesis, I found that competitive actions of broad scope have a strong and positively 
significant relationship with divestitures. This result supports my argument that competitive 
behavior may drive strategic actions such as divestitures. Indeed, experience and knowledge 
obtained from exposure to larger competitive settings influence managerial decisions of 
abandoning particular businesses where the firm may not be able to sustain its competitive 
advantage in the future. 
I did not find support for Hypothesis 6. Diverse repertoires of action are not associated with 
divestitures. My reasoning for this association was related to the fact that the variety of actions 
used by the firm as its competitive repertoire is resource-intensive and may lead to resource 
depletion (Larrañeta et al., 2014), thereby triggering resource divestments. But findings show 
that this resource depletion does not motivate divestitures. Divestitures can be understood within 
the evolutionary search process as a way for firms to retire from some businesses they deem less 
attractive (Chang, 1996; Bergh and Lim, 2008). Recent perspectives look at divestitures as a 
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restructuring asset decision that diverts firm resources into more profitable areas of business, 
often as a response to technological innovation and change (Dutt and Vidal, 2016). In this 
dissertation, I did not find that the experience and knowledge generated by the environmental 
exposure provided by diverse repertoires were a determinant of divestitures, neither as an asset 
reconfiguration strategy nor as an adaptation to new technological environments. 
Action Scope and Repertoire and the Adoption of Corporate Social Responsibility  
In hypotheses 4 and 7, I posited that competitive behavior in the form of broad scope actions and 
diverse repertoires would be associated with the adoption of CSR strategies. I based my 
arguments on the fact that CSR strategies are innovative and may be prompted by a deeper 
understanding of consumers’ needs and market conditions that the exposure provided by broad 
and diverse competitive behavior is likely to promote. I did not find support for my predicted 
positive association between competitive actions with broad scope and CSR (H4). However, my 
results show a marginally positive and significant relationship between diverse repertoires and 
CSR (H7). 
Although the exposure of the firm to larger competitive settings through actions of broad 
competitive scope is likely to create a stronger opportunity awareness, it does not lead to the 
adoption of CSR. These results are surprising as it is plausible that experience and knowledge of 
consumers and markets may be determinants of innovative strategies such as CSR. However, 
these strategies imply significant investments that the firm might not want or be able to adopt. 
This financial link seems to be relevant because I found that the presence of slack resources 
significantly and positively moderates the relationship between action scope and the adoption of 
CSR initiatives (H8). Therefore, although results for hypothesis 4 contradict my expectation that 
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competitive behavior might be a driver of CSR, I found that this competitive behavior does 
indeed contribute for the adoption of CSR in the presence of available financial resources, i.e., 
slack.  
These results should motivate a more thorough investigation of the effects of competitive 
behavior in CSR. Previous research found that often firms adopt “green” initiatives as 
competitive devices that create competitive advantage (Bansal and Roth, 2000). It is important 
therefore to study the links between competition and CSR and find the different mechanisms that 
might explain the influence of competitive actions on the adoption of socially responsible 
strategies. I anticipate that competitive actions may influence the adoption of different social 
responsibility strategies. For example, it may be that competitive actions are drivers of 
environmentally friendly strategies but not of philanthropic and socially oriented policies. A 
finer grained construct of CSR might be needed to understand the possible role of competition on 
CSR strategies. 
The Moderating Effect of Organizational Slack in Strategic Choices Driven by Action 
Scope and Repertoire  
Hypothesis 8 and 9 suggest that organizational slack strengthens the association between action 
with broad scope and diverse repertoires of action and the choice of diversification strategies and 
CSR. The logic for these hypotheses is that the availability of slack provides the firm with a 
resource cushion that sanctions search into new market domains thereby amplifying strategic 
choice. From the point of view of managerial decision-making, it seems plausible that resource 
availability will reinforce managerial availability bias towards particular choices that might 
derive from salient and recent experience on the competitive arena. 
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However, I did not find support for my prediction that the presence of slack resources would 
strengthen the relationship between both action scope and repertoire and diversification. From 
my test of hypotheses, I conclude that the adoption of competitive actions with broad scope and 
the reliance on diverse repertoires of action drives the choice of strategies of diversification 
without requiring the presence of extra internal resources such as slack. However, as mentioned 
before, the presence of financial resources in the form of organizational slack influences the 
effects of competitive behavior on CSR strategies. My interpretation of this result is that firms 
might deem that CSR initiatives requires the availability of financial resources that help 
minimize the risk involved in adopting such innovative strategies. When diversifying, however, 
it is more likely that firms seek different sources of financing such as external financing and 
debt. Organizational slack will not in the case of diversification influence the association 
between competition and strategic choice.  
Limitations 
This research has limitations. First, it is intended as an introductory approach to a theory of 
competitive action that extends the prediction of effects of competitive behavior on 
organizational performance to strategic choice. The idea that tactical competitive actions can be 
drivers of strategy has been hinted in the competitive dynamics literature (for example, Rindova 
et al., 2010) and can be extrapolated from business accounts reported in the press or firms’ 
websites. I started this investigation by looking at decision-making mechanisms that are likely to 
stimulate managerial attention to particular strategic choices. I theorized that through the 
acquisition of resources such as knowledge and experience in the competitive environment, 
managers are bound to be influenced by the salience of such experience and make their strategic 
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decisions accordingly. I predicted that managers’ choice would be influenced by the availability 
bias but it is plausible that other biases and heuristics may affect managerial decision processes. 
This is a first attempt to look at how characteristics of competitive actions might drive strategic 
choice by offering an environmental exposure to the competitive environment. However, I do not 
explore all characteristics of competitive action that might drive strategic choice. For example, 
my model does not include action timing. Timing is an important dimension of competitive 
behavior that has been examined extensively in the first mover advantage literature but that has 
also a very distinctive relevance in competitive dynamics (Lee et al., 2000; Chen and Macmillan, 
1992; Ferrier et al., 1999; Andrevski et al., 2016).  Outside the scope of this study is also 
competitive aggressiveness (Nadkarni et al., 2015) and repertoire complexity (Connelly et al., 
2017), characteristics that are likely to have impact in the firm’s choice of strategic directions. 
Finally, although I chose a variety of strategic alternatives, competitive behavior might lead to 
other choices. In future research it would be particular adequate to adopt finer grained measures 
of CSR. Competitive behavior plausibly affects a firm’s social and environmental profile but 
perhaps it does so at different levels. A more detailed examination of the association between 
competitive action characteristics and the different aspects of socially responsible policies is 
warranted for a better understanding of this relationship. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has implications for the strategic management literature for several reasons. 
First, this research links competition to strategic choice. This relationship is important to 
understand how firms perform and survive in the marketplace and the present dissertation offers 
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an alternative explanation on how tactical competitive behavior may be the source of important 
strategic policies. 
Second, it introduces an action driven theory of strategy. This perspective offers an innovative 
approach to possible sources of strategic choice. It hypothesizes and finds preliminary results 
that competitive behavior may drive the firm’s choice of strategy. Therefore, it lays ground for a 
future more detailed examination of the links between competition and strategy. Research in 
competitive dynamics predominantly explores the effects of competitive actions on 
organizational performance based on the assumption that competitors’ responses amplify or 
decrease the financial results of competitive moves. The present study extends the theoretical 
framework of this field of knowledge by acknowledging that the firm itself is influenced by its 
competitive behavior. By shifting the focus of extant research in competition to strategic choice, 
my dissertation opens the door to the exam of the conditions under which a variety of strategic 
alternatives such as diversification, divestitures, and CSR influences performance. Future studies 
should take on the task of determining if the link between tactical and strategic behaviors has 
financial repercussions on the firm. 
Finally, the present dissertation presents an empirical model based on observable variables that 
measures how the number of tactical actions a firm adopts yearly, the scope of these actions in 
terms of new geographic markets affected, new technologies used, and innovation in product 
lines and services as well as the diversity of actions employed in competition, drives the adoption 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients. 
 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Scope 27.1 1.03                  
2. Repertoire 1.96 0.04  0.74                 
3. Diversification 0.11 0.00  0.22  0.15                
4. CSR 1.89 0.10  0.37  0.35  0.17               
5. Divestitures 0.76 0.05  0.27  0.25  0.13  0.09              
6. Age 35.5 0.58  0.05  0.11  0.17  0.16  0.17             
7. Leverage 0.82 0.37  0.00  (0.02) 0.07  0.00  0.01  0.03            
8. ROA 0.07 0.00  0.12  0.11  (0.03) 0.12  (0.03) (0.06) (0.02)          
9. Current Ratio 1.91 0.04  0.03  (0.04) (0.08) 0.01  (0.12) (0.32) (0.04) 0.21          
10. Inventory 
Intensity 0.09 0.00  0.13  (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.00) 0.07  0.00  0.04  0.15         
11. SGA Intensity 0.23 0.00  0.15  0.11  (0.01) 0.18  (0.04) (0.23) 0.00  0.10  0.24  (0.07)       
12. R&D Intensity 0.03 0.00  0.84  (0.02) 0.07  0.09  (0.05) (0.15) (0.01) 0.16  0.39  0.03  0.48       
13. Advert. 
Intensity 0.02 0.00  0.04  0.13  (0.03) 0.07  (0.06) (0.11) (0.00) 0.17  0.17  0.03  0.42  0.39      
14. Capital Intensity 0.08 0.00  0.14  (0.09) (0.04) (0.12) 0.03  0.17  0.00  (0.28) (0.23) (0.16) (0.25) (0.34) (0.35)    
15. Size 3.29 0.04  0.38  0.31  0.09  0.22  0.17  0.33  0.01  0.15  (0.25) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) 0.12  (0.23)   
16. Potential Slack (0.82) 0.37  0.00  0.02  (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (1.00) 0.02  0.04  (0.00) (0.00) 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01   
17. Long Term 
Slack* 0.23 0.17  0.08  0.02  0.04  0.00  (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) 0.04  (0.00) (0.02) 0.00  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 0.04  0.00  
                   










Table 2. Effects of Action Scope and Repertoire on Diversification 
 
  Controls   Model 1   Model 2   
  
DV: 
Diversification    
DV: 
Diversification   
DV: 
Diversification   
Constant 0.00 (0.00) -0.091 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) 
Diversification 0.316*** (0.10) 0.307*** (0.09) 0.28*** (0.09) 
Average 
Diversification 0.15 (0.26) 0.348 (0.24) 0.09 (0.16) 
Concentration -0.05 (0.16) -0.029 (0.16) 0.00 (0.00) 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)  
Leverage 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Potential Slack 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.01) 
Size 0.013 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 0 (0.01) 
Current Ratio -0.001 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.13 (0.18) 
Inventory 
Intensity -0.097 (0.17) -0.064 (0.18) 0.03 (0.09) 
SGA Intensity 0.011 (0.09) 0.031 (0.10) 0.78* (0.46) 
R&D Intensity 0.433 (0.45) 0.38 (0.43) -0.85 (0.60) 
Advertising 
Intensity -0.588 (0.55) -0.566 (0.58) 0.07 (0.18) 
Capital Intensity 0.031 (0.18) 0.105 (0.18) 0.00 (0.00)  
Long Term Slack 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.19** (0.09) 
ROA -0.210** (0.09) -0.188** (0.09) -0.19** (0.09)  
Scope   0.001*** (0.00)   
Repertoire    › 0.03*** (0.01) 
Observations 1,133   1,133   1,133   
Wald Chi2 819.83  217.78  473.66  
Arellano-Bond 
Test for AR(2) in 
first differences -4.08  -4.157  -4.131  
Hansen Test 116.94  135.64  133.21  
Difference in 
Hansen Test 54.76   75.55   71.41   











Table 3. Effects of Action Scope and Repertoire on Related Diversification 
 
 
  Controls   Model 1a   Model 2a   
  
DV: Related 
Diversification   
DV: Related 
Diversification   
DV: Related 
Diversification   
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.09 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00)  
Related 
Diversification 0.38*** (0.08) 0.31*** (0.07) 0.33*** (0.07) 
Average 
Diversification -0.12 (0.24) 0.02 (0.25) 0.07 0.25  
Concentration 0.02 (0.16) 0.04 (0.16) 0.12 (0.17) 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Leverage 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Potential Slack 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Size 0.004 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Current Ratio -0.003 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Inventory Intensity 0.06 (0.16) 0.11 (0.17) 0.04 (0.17) 
SGA Intensity -0.02 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 
R&D Intensity 0.53 (0.45) 0.54 (0.45) 0.74 (0.47) 
Advertising Intensity -0.63 (0.50) -0.57 (0.48) -0.84* (0.50) 
Capital Intensity 0.08 (0.17) 0.18 (0.18) 0.13 (0.17) 
Long Term Slack 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
ROA -0.16* (0.09) -0.15* (0.09) -0.15* (0.08) 
Scope   0.001** (0.00)    
Repertoire     0.02*** (0.01) 
Observations 1,133   1,133   1,133   
Wald Chi2 663.82  166.21  393.51  
Arellano-Bond Test 
for AR(2) in first 
differences -4.46  -4.4  -4.63  
Hansen Test 120.52  134.93  131.79  
Difference in Hansen 
Test 64.68   72.57   76.75   










Table 4. Effects of Action Scope on Unrelated Diversification 
 
 
  Controls   Model 1b   
  
DV: Unrelated 
Diversification   
DV: Unrelated 
Diversification   
Constant 0.00 (0.00) 0.011 (0.05) 
Unrelated 
Diversification 0.41*** (0.16) 0.51*** (0.11) 
Average 
Diversification 0.23* (0.13) 0.22* (0.12) 
Concentration -0.09 (0.11) -0.12 (0.12) 
Age 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Leverage 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Potential Slack 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Size 0.01* (0.01) 0.002 (0.01) 
Current Ratio 0.003 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 
Inventory Intensity -0.152 (0.10) -0.16 (0.11) 
SGA Intensity 0.033 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 
R&D Intensity -0.20 (0.25) -0.27 (0.26) 
Advertising 
Intensity 0.083 (0.36) 0.11 (0.32) 
Capital Intensity -0.052 (0.09) -0.08 (0.10) 
Long Term Slack 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
ROA -0.042 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) 
Scope   0.00 (0.00)  
Observations 1,133   1,133   
Wald Chi2 164.21  186.1  
Arellano-Bond 
Test for AR(2) in 
first differences -2.29  -3.23  
Hansen Test 74.32  91.81  
Difference in 
Hansen Test 43.51   58.27   












Table 5. Effects of Action Scope and Repertoire on Divestitures 
 
 
  Controls   Model 1c   Model 2b   
  
DV: 
Divestitures   
DV: 
Divestitures   
DV: 
Divestitures   
Constant 0.33 (0.44) 0.19 (0.44) 0.13 (0.41) 
Divestitures 0.74*** (0.16) 0.63*** (0.14) 0.72*** (0.15) 
Average 
Diversification -0.73 (0.89) 0.23 (0.83) -0.05 (0.82) 
Concentration -1.06 (0.70) -0.76 (0.65) -0.16 (0.60) 
Age 0 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Leverage 0.001 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Potential Slack 0 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Size 0.09* (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 
Current Ratio -0.007 (0.09) -0.07 (0.10) -0.02 (0.09) 
Inventory Intensity -1.01 (0.88) -0.90 (0.90) -0.90 (0.88) 
SGA Intensity 0.11 (0.41) 0.09 (0.44) 0.33 (0.40) 
R&D Intensity -2.48 (1.81) -1.81 (1.70) -0.57 (1.63) 
Advertising 
Intensity -3.252 (2.73) -2.47 (2.53) -4.41* (2.41) 
Capital Intensity -2.8*** (1.08) -2.37** (1.12) -2.56** (1.06) 
Long Term Slack 0 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
ROA -1.72*** (0.51) -1.46*** (0.50) -1.45*** (0.51) 
Scope   0.004*** (0.00)   
Repertoire     0.06 (0.03) 
Observations 1,127   1,127   1,127   
Wald Chi2 667.49  651.2  473.66  
Arellano-Bond 
Test for AR(2) in 
first differences -4.18  -4.3  -4.26  
Hansen Test 120.8  135.76  126.38  
Difference in 
Hansen Test 43.89   60.69   48.03   













Table 6. Effects of Action Scope and Repertoire on Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 
  Controls   Model 1d   Model 2c   
  
DV: 
CSR   DV: CSR   DV: CSR   
Constant -6.07** (2.62) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CSR 0.38*** (0.06) 0.39*** (0.06) 0.33*** (0.06) 
Average CSR -0.02 (0.17) -0.08 (0.17) -0.07 (0.16) 
Concentration 1.204 (2.42) 0.95 (2.53) 1.23 (2.33) 
Age -0.008 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 
Size 0.43** (0.20) 0.37* (0.21) 0.33 (0.23) 
Current Ratio 0.07 (0.13) -0.004 (0.16) -0.02 (0.15) 
Inventory 
Intensity 6.25 (4.50) 7.75* (4.62) 6.98 (5.01) 
SGA Intensity 2.13 (2.73) 2.55 (2.76) 2.89 (2.66) 
R&D Intensity -2.64 (4.08) -3.56 (4.73) -3.71 (4.85) 
Adv. Intensity -1.7 (4.59) 2.44 (1.75) 1.99 (1.73) 
Capital Intensity 3.25* (1.88) -4.77 (4.33) -4.8 (4.09) 
Absorbed Slack 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Immediate Slack -0.27 (0.65) -0.09 (0.65) 0.11 (0.76) 
ROA 0.18 (1.28) -0.15 (1.29) 0.01 1.37  
Scope   0.005 (0.01)   
Repertoire     0.35* (0.18) 
Observations 1,215   1,215   1,215   
Wald Chi2 5333.94  4820.3  2670.73  
Arellano-Bond 
Test for AR(2) in 
first differences -4.17  -4.34  -4.01  
Hansen Test 124.87  124.55  130.97  
Difference in 
Hansen Test 58.47   51.79   62.08   












Table 7. Effects of the interaction between Action Scope and Slack on Diversification and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 
  Controls   
Model 
1e   Controls   
Model 
1f   
    
DV: 
Diversification       
DV: CSR 
  
Constant -0.112 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Diversification 0.31*** (0.10) 0.35*** (0.09)   
  
CSR   
  
0.37*** (0.06) 0.38*** (0.06) 
Avg. Diversif. 0.293 (0.27) 0.35 (0.23)   
  
Average CSR   
  
-0.07 (0.15) 0.11 (0.15) 
Concentration -0.013 (0.17) -0.05 (0.17) 0.91 (2.06) -0.53 (2.15) 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Leverage 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Potential Slack 0.011 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)  
Size 0.002 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.23 (0.18) 0.19 (0.22) 
Current Ratio -0.06 (0.16) -0.015* (0.01) -0.03 (0.13) -0.12 (0.16) 
Inventory 
Intensity -0.06 (0.16) 0.025 (0.17)     
SGA Intensity 0.016 (0.12) 0.00 (0.00) 1.44 (1.80) 0.00 (0.00)  
R&D Intensity 0.465 (0.47) 0.30 (0.42) -2.66 (6.21) -6.01 (6.24) 
Adv. Intensity -0.407 (0.59) -0.57 (0.56) 9.26 (10.2) 6.75 (9.04) 
Cap. Intensity 0.098 (0.18) 0.16 (0.18) 6.02 (3.97) 7.010* (4.06) 
Imm. Slack    
  
0.10 (0.64) 0.52 (0.70) 
ROA -0.20** (0.10) -0.14 (0.09) 1.25 (1.23) 1.57 (1.23) 
Scope   0.001 (0.001)   -0.03** (0.01)  
Absorb_Slack   0.07 (0.11)   -1.40 (2.17)  
Scope*Slack   0.001 (0.002)   0.09** (0.04) 
   
     
  
Observations 1,204   1,204   1,230   1,230   
Wald Chi2 181.34  218.62  7648.15  4102.45  
Arellano-Bond 
Test for AR(2) in 
first differences -4.00  -4.40  -4.45  -4.5  
Hansen Test 112.5  131.98  127.51  135.05  
Difference in 
Hansen Test 52.22   62.20   53.07   60.66   








Table 8. Effects of the interaction between Repertoire and Slack on Diversification and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
  Controls   Model 2d   Controls   
Model 
2e   
    
DV: 
Diversification       
DV: CSR 
  
Constant -0.112 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Diversification 0.31*** (0.10) 0.35*** (0.09)     
CSR     0.37*** (0.06) 0.368*** (0.06) 
Avg. Diversif. 0.293 (0.27) 0.382* (0.22)     
Average CSR     -0.17 (0.14) -0.16 (0.14) 
Concentration -0.01 (0.17) 0.02 (0.17) 0.017 (2.33) -0.16 (2.15) 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.006 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Leverage 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.002 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Potential Slack 0.011 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
Size 0.002 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.26 (0.18) 0.21 (0.20) 
Current Ratio -0.06 (0.16) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.13) -0.15 (0.15) 
SGA Intensity 0.02 (0.12) -0.05 (0.16) 1.10 (1.84) 0.00 (0.00)  
R&D Intensity 0.47 (0.47) 0.10 (0.14) -3.89 (6.89) -6.09 (6.34) 
Adv. Intensity -0.41 (0.59) 0.65 (0.44) 11.7 (9.60) 8.05 (10.1) 
Capital Intensity 0.09 (0.18) -0.81 (0.59) 7.72* (4.63) 9.67** (4.44) 
Immediate Slack     -0.004 (0.60) 0.63 (0.73) 
ROA -0.20** (0.10) -0.15 (0.09) 1.781 (1.40) 2.04 (1.38) 
Repertoire   0.03 (0.02)   -0.26 (0.25) 
Absorb_Slack   0.00 (0.00)   -2.58 (2.62)  
Repertoire*Slack   -0.013 (0.05)   1.68*** (0.81) 
Observations 1,204   1204   1,215   1,215   
Wald Chi2 181.34  501.02  4664.36  3353.77  
Arellano-Bond 
Test for AR(2) in 
first differences -4.00  -4.38  -4.43  -4.76  
Hansen Test 112.5  126.28  123.65  137.9  
Difference in 
Hansen Test 52.22   56.13   55.42   70.39   
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